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Abstract
How can a person judge another individual’s moral character? One way may be to look to their
moral and immoral actions. However, should all actions be weighed equally, whether they
occurred in the near or distant past? Moral actions do not occur in a temporal vacuum, yet
relatively little research has examined the role of time in moral judgment. We expected that
people would weigh a previous immoral act differently depending on when it occurred and on
their beliefs about personal malleability. Individuals differ in their implicit theories about the
degree to which human characteristics, such as moral character or personality, are malleable
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Entity theorists believe that personal characteristics remain stable
and fixed throughout one’s life, while incremental theorists believe that these characteristics can
change over time. We predicted that incremental theorists would attenuate harsh moral
judgments to a greater degree with the passage of time. We also expected that motivated
reasoning could influence moral judgments, and examined this by varying race of the offender
and assessing prejudice levels. Three studies were designed to examine how implicit theories
about personal mutability, time, and offender race affect moral judgments. Participants read
about an offender’s past commission of a crime. In Study 1, incremental theorists were more
forgiving of the offender and held less punitive beliefs regardless of time (3 or 10 years ago), and
that modern racism predicted negative reactions to offenders perceived as Black (but not White),
greater subjective recency, and a tendency to shift to a more entity perspective. Study 2
attempted to manipulate offender race, but was unable to do so effectively. In Study 3, offenders
who committed crimes in the distant past (3 and 10 years) were judged more positively than
those from the recent past (a few months ago), and preliminary evidence that incremental
theorists are more positive towards the offender than entity theorists in the distant (but not
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recent) condition. After using a more overt race manipulation, however, modern racism did not
systematically predict judgments about a Black offender, nor did it predict shifts in implicit
theories.
Keywords: implicit theories, moral judgments, time
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In 1999, a man was convicted of robbing a Burger King. He was sentenced to 13 years in
prison, and was told to wait at his home, where he had been released on bail, to be taken to jail.
He waited. For years, Cornealious “Mike” Anderson waited to be taken to prison. At one point,
he asked his lawyer when he would be jailed, and was told to keep waiting. After some time
passed, he wondered if his sentence had been revoked, and started to rebuild his life, changing
himself from a young robber to a husband, father, business owner, and respected member of the
community. Then, 13 years after his original sentence, when his release date would have been,
the justice system noticed their error, and did what they would do to any criminal on the loose:
they arrested him (Lussenhop, 2013; Bever, 2014).
There was a public uproar once this case hit the media. Time had passed, the public
protested. He had clearly changed. He had spent the amount of time he would have been
imprisoned becoming a productive, law-abiding member of society. The justice system
disagreed. Everyone needed to follow the law, they said, and this person had yet to pay his debt
to society for this crime regardless of the changes he went through in the interim. There had been
no public outcry when his initial sentence was announced; no one thought it was inappropriate
for this man to serve thirteen years in prison. Why, then, was this any different now?
This case is intriguing not only for its legal and societal implications, but because it poses
some fundamental questions about human behaviours and beliefs about morality and immoral
acts, and the role of time in these judgments. Can people change? At what point do we believe
that change has occurred? How long does one’s responsibility for undesirable acts extend? Does
the passage of time matter, or should it be irrelevant? What other factors influence the degree to
which we weigh the passage of time into judgments of change?
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These questions, among others, form the basis of this research. Through the lens of this
real-world event, we intend to examine how people’s beliefs about the possibility of change, and
the passage of time, come to influence their moral judgments of others.
Implicit Theories of Change
Implicit theories of change are the assumptions people make about the malleability of
human characteristics, such as intelligence or personality (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Entity
theorists believe that one’s personal characteristics remain fixed throughout life, whereas
incremental theorists believe that personal characteristics can change1. People may also hold
different implicit theories for different domains: some characteristics may be seen as more fixed
than others. Questions of change and stability are particularly relevant when thinking about
morality. One way to infer a person’s moral character, or to predict their future moral behaviour,
is to look at their past moral or immoral actions. To what extent, however, are those past actions
reflective of a stable “core” characteristic called morality, or to what degree might one’s moral
character have changed? These are the questions that research into implicit theories of change
attempts to answer. What domains of implicit theories are most pertinent when it comes to
making moral judgments about a person? People can hold implicit theories about the nature of
morality itself - whether morality is fixed or fluid (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997). However
we reasoned that general person theories (whether a person’s basic character and personality
changes or is fixed over time) might also be closely tied to people’s judgments of moral
transgressions (Dweck et al., 1995). Though personality, or “the kind of person” one is, is not as
1

Implicit theories are measured on a continuous scale, and a person’s beliefs can range anywhere from a strong
belief in fixedness to a strong belief in malleability, with a wide degree of variability between those two points.
However, it is common for two dichotomous theories, entity and incremental theory, to be described, with each
representing relatively stronger beliefs in fixedness (entity theory) or malleability (incremental theory).
Throughout this paper we will sometimes refer to these dichotomous labels, but recognize that we are describing
beliefs on a continuum.
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directly reflective of one’s moral character, morality is sometimes conceived as a facet of
personality and overall character. Statistically, people’s general person implicit theories and their
theories of morality are typically highly intercorrelated (Ward & Wilson, 2015).
Though various domains of implicit theories have been studied in depth (e.g., Dweck et
al., 1995; Blackwell, Trzesniewsky, & Dweck, 2007; Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2015;
Greenwald et al., 2002), relatively less has been established about the role of implicit theories in
a moral context. Indeed, the research that has been done has shown mixed results. Entity
theorists have been shown to be more punitive of bad behaviour than incremental theorists (Chiu,
Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997), and show more negative affect after reading about transgressions
(Miller, Burgoon & Hall, 2007). Entity theorists also tend to believe that punishment is more
important than rehabilitation, while incremental theorists tend to endorse the opposite view
(Gervey, Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1999). These attitudes toward crime and punishment are
supported by the basic suppositions underpinning the implicit theory. Specifically, because an
entity theorist doubts that a person’s morality or personality can change, negative behaviours are
a sign of a greater, permanent personality flaw, and rehabilitation cannot change this fact. On the
other hand, incremental theorists’ assumptions about the possibility of personal change would
support a belief that rehabilitation is possible even after serious immoral acts. However, not all
evidence suggests that incremental theorists will be automatically more forgiving following
transgressions. Ng and Tong (2013) found that incremental theorists demonstrated less
forgiveness than entity theorists after an interpersonal transgression. They argued that this
pattern was due to the tendency of incremental theorists to attribute a higher level of
responsibility to transgressors. An entity theorist who believes a person cannot change may also
see that person as less responsible for their innate, fixed qualities, while an incremental theorist
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may see a moral or personal failure as reflective of a person’s choices, not characteristics.
Supporting this view, Kammrath and Peetz (2012) reported that incremental theorists are more
upset by romantic partners who commit the interpersonal transgression of breaking a promise to
change, while entity theorists, who never truly expected the promised change, are more
accepting. In sum then, although the literature is limited, there is reason to believe that
incremental theorists could be more forgiving of a past transgression (perhaps especially in
situations where there has been enough time or evidence of change), yet on the other hand
incremental theorists might judge more harshly an actor who they see as having personal control
over an immoral choice yet choosing not to change. Although the current studies are not
designed to disentangle these inconsistencies, our theorizing falls more in line with the notion
that incremental theorists may show more willingness to forgive or accept the possibility that
once a thief does not mean always a thief. There may be important exceptions to this rule – for
instance, in situations where a perpetrator is judged in the moment of a deliberate harm,
incremental theorists’ belief in personal control could override their belief in change.
Additionally, we suspect that repeated offenses (as is often the case with romantic partners
lobbying for change) may be judged harshly by incremental theorists who could interpret lack of
change as a choice. Neither of these circumstances characterize the current studies, which instead
focus on a one-time moral transgression and situate it in the past.
Despite the inconsistencies in the previous literature, the existing research does share one
major consistency: it focuses on moral transgressions (whether written scenarios or memories) in
the present or the very recent past, and as such is largely removed from any systematic
investigation of the temporal context. It makes good sense to imagine that the passage of time
would matter here – if a moral transgression occurs in the moment, people’s implicit theories
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may play a different role than when an immoral act occurred in the relatively distant past. Ward
and Wilson (2015) found that incremental (but not entity) theorists were more critical of their
subjectively distant selves, showing evidence that incremental and entity theorists may make
divergent judgments based on the real or felt passage of time. One reason for the outcry over
Anderson’s story of arrest after 13 years has to do with the passage of time – and the apparent
rehabilitation that occurred over those years. Because of it, we reasoned that this real world event
would offer an interesting, engaging context in which to study how people’s implicit theories
related to moral judgments over time.
This story elicited powerful reactions on both sides of the debate (e.g., Lussenhop, 2013;
Bever, 2014), and we reasoned that implicit theories of malleability could play a central role in
explaining the intensity of public outcry, as well as vast differences of opinions between
individuals hearing about the same case. Incremental theorists might point to the man’s changed
behaviour as evidence that, fundamentally, he is not the same person who committed the original
crime – his personality and moral essence have changed dramatically. Entity theorists, however,
could point to the original crime as evidence of a moral or personality flaw, and argue that
because people do not change, that flaw still persists. Stated more generally, we hypothesized
that incremental theorists will have more positive judgments of the actor who committed a past
immoral act (a crime in this case) overall than entity theorists. We chose to examine this basic
question in a qualitatively enriched context to capture how these implicit theories operate in the
real world; however we acknowledge that because the specific story we examine involves
several complexities in addition to time (unserved sentence, evidence of rehabilitation, no active
avoidance of the sentence), we cannot claim to test all instantiations of the more general
proposition that implicit theories will matter when it comes to moral judgments situated in time.
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Time and Implicit Theories
As noted previously, immoral actions do not occur in a temporal vacuum, yet often moral
judgements are studied as they occur, in the moment, in response to a moral act or scenario
(Haidt, 2001; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002;
Graham et al., 2011). One topic that is not well understood is the role of time in people’s
judgments of morality. The ways that people grapple with the question of time in moral
judgment is evident in how people react to even long-past transgressions, from youthful
indiscretions to Nazi war crimes coming to light half a century later. How do individuals decide
the relevance of past misdeeds to that person’s current moral character?
Most work regarding time and morality has focused on differences between past and
future actions (e.g., Caruso, 2010); however, some research has looked at the role of time passing
in regards to past moral and interpersonal transgressions. Escobedo and Adolphs (2010) analyzed
people’s moral autobiographical memories, and found that self-nominated memories of their own
positive moral events came from more recent periods of time than memories of negative moral
events. Wohl and McGrath (2007) found that in interpersonal transgressions, people were more
willing to forgive another person if the act was more distant in calendar time. This was also true
of acts that felt subjectively distant; that is, acts that feel psychologically farther away from the
present, regardless of the length of calendar time that has passed. There has been little systematic
analysis, however, of how temporal distance from another’s moral transgression will impact
people’s judgments about the transgressor.
How might the passage of time be related to one’s implicit theories of change, in the
context of immoral behaviour? We propose that those who hold the two opposing beliefs in
change should react differently to the passage of time. For incremental theorists, a greater length
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of time should suggest a greater amount of change: if change can occur over time, then the
greater length of time that has passed, the higher the likelihood of change (Ward & Wilson,
2015). However, for entity theorists, the passage of time should not matter, or should matter to a
lesser extent. If personal characteristics remain fixed throughout life, then additional distance
from an immoral event should not indicate a greater possibility of change, as change should not
be possible at any time. In other words, while judgments of an offender overall, given more time
passing, may be more positive than after less time, judgments made by incremental theorists will
be more sensitive to the passage of time than judgments made by entity theorists.
Subjective Time
We might expect that calendar time – the number of months or years that have passed
since an event occurred – will play a role in how a past immoral act is judged. Time, however, is
not solely measured by the actual passage of dates on a calendar. People also have a subjective
sense of time: that is, how close or distant an event or point in time feels from the present
(Wilson & Ross, 2003; Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010; Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson,
Convers, & Sackett, 2010; Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). These two aspects of time
are often highly related, with events that happened yesterday also feeling closer than the events
of a year ago. It is an imperfect relationship, however, and objective and subjective time can
often be at odds with one another. For example, people feel subjectively farther away from
personal failures than from successes that occurred in the same time period (Ross & Wilson,
2002).
In earlier studies, we have found that the actual passage of time since a moral or
interpersonal transgression is less important than one’s subjective sense of time when making
judgments about the actions of others. Presenting moral transgressions as having occurred in the
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recent or distant past was not as important to participant judgments of immoral acts as how
recent or distant those transgressions subjectively felt (Williams & Wilson, 2014). The subjective
distance a participant felt from a moral transgression was a far better predictor than objective,
calendar distance for how harshly the act would be judged, particularly for severe acts. This
means that it matters little if the event happened a week or a year ago, but whether it feels like
yesterday or like ancient history.
What might this mean when making judgments about someone with an immoral act or
criminal offense in his or her past? Similarly to objective time, we would predict that judgments
of an offender would be more positive in the present given a greater sense of subjective distance
from the original offense. In addition, when objective and subjective distance diverge from one
another, it is possible that subjective time will play a bigger role in overall judgments than
calendar time. However, in the current studies, only calendar (objective) time is varied
systematically; participants’ perceived or subjective feelings of time are measured as a dependent
variable.
Changing Theories of Change
Although people’s implicit theories of change may affect their judgments of immoral
acts, recent evidence has demonstrated that in contexts where people are motivated to draw
certain conclusions about temporally relevant information, the judgments that people make may,
in turn, affect people’s subsequent implicit theories. According to Leith et al. (2014), there is
evidence that people may shift their endorsement of implicit theories in order to reach desired
conclusions; that is, when an incremental or entity theory would lend more evidence to one’s
beliefs, a person may endorse that theory to bolster or maintain those beliefs, particularly when
there is strong motivation to do so. For example, in one study, participants read a scenario about
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a child sex offender who was moving to either their own community or a distant community.
Those who would be most threatened by the offender (participants with children who would be
near the offender), and therefore most motivated to adopt a negative attitude, were significantly
more likely to shift towards an entity theory – if the offender could not change, their negative
attitudes were fully justified.
Because of this evidence of motivated shifting, we generated an additional exploratory
hypothesis for the current study. We wondered if judgments of past criminal acts more generally
might be a context in which the perception of a threat might lead to a shift in implicit theories. If
a criminal offender is released without legal consequence, people who believe that the offender
still poses a threat would be motivated to adopt an entity perspective to justify their pre-existing
negative beliefs, or in order to remain vigilant.
What factors might feature in people’s motivation to emphasize the changeability or fixed
nature of an offender’s morality? In the child sex offender study (Leith et al 2014) nearby parents
were most threatened; however this demographic group would not be expected to react strongly
to every type of crime. One factor that may play an important role in people’s motivated
judgments of crime is the race of the offender. In the United States and beyond, Blacks in
general have been perceived as more violent and aggressive than Whites, more involved in
criminal activities, and more racially disposed to commit crime (e.g., Welch, 2007; Mears et al.,
2013; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010), leading to what Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz (2004) called the
“racial typification of crime”. Due to this racial stereotype, it is possible that a Black offender
may be more threatening in the context of a past crime than a White offender, particularly for
those who hold more racist beliefs.
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As a result, we believe that people prone to racism, as measured by the Modern Racism
Scale, may be motivated to adopt a more entity perspective when presented with a Black
offender who has changed. Accepting the notion that a Black offender has demonstrated a
permanent change for the better may be a threat for those who hold racist beliefs, which would in
turn generate a greater motivation to shift implicit theories.
Overview of the Present Research
We entered into this research with five major hypotheses:
1. Incremental theorists will have more positive judgments of a prior offender (who
committed an immoral act in the past) overall than entity theorists.
2. Judgments may be more positive overall after more time has passed since the original
offense than when less time has passed.
3. Judgments about prior offenders made by incremental theorists will be more sensitive to
the passage of time than judgments made by entity theorists. Specifically, incremental
theorists are expected to make more positive judgments when more time has passed;
entity theorists may not do so.
4. People high in modern racism may be motivated to adopt a more entity perspective when
presented with a Black offender who has changed than if a White offender has changed.
5. The race of the offender, in concert with the modern racism levels of participants, will
combine to produce differences in how positively people judge the prior offender.
Specifically, those high in modern racism, who are presented with a Black offender, will
generate more negative judgments of that offender even though the transgression is
identical.
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To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies. We created a scenario which was
adapted from the previously discussed news article about an earlier unpunished robbery.
Participants were recruited online. After completing a premeasure of implicit theories,
participants read the adapted article, which presented either a Black or White offender who had
committed an offense that was described as having occurred either three or ten years earlier, or
(in Study 2 and 3) within the last month. Participants then provided their judgments about the
criminal offender on a wide variety of relational and legal measures, and completed measures
assessing post-manipulation implicit theories, as well as modern racism.
Study 1
Method
Participants. Two hundred and twelve American residents recruited from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk participated in the study for $1.00 as compensation. Twenty-two participants
who self-identified as having not paid attention to the task, or who failed an attention check,
were excluded, with 190 participants (104 females; M age = 38.7, SD = 12.5, range = 18-66; 158
White, 13 Black, 8 Hispanic, 11 other) remaining in the final analysis.
Procedure.
Premeasure. Participants were invited to participate in a study that investigated
judgments of legal news articles. Upon their consent, participants were presented with a
questionnaire containing several measures that were unrelated to the present study. Embedded
within these items were three items measuring implicit theories of morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong,
& Fu, 1997), and three items measuring general person implicit theories (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995) (see Appendix A). These questions asked participants to indicate, on a six-point scale, how
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much they agreed or disagreed with statements such as: “People’s moral character is something
basic about them and they can’t change it much” (for morality) and “Everyone is a certain kind
of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that” (for general person). We
chose to combine the three general personal items and the three morality items into one six-item
variable, given a reliability analysis that revealed all six items had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .96; the
Alpha for the morality items, separately, was .92, while the Alpha for the general person items
was .95.
News article. Participants were then asked to read one of four news articles about a
current legal issue (see Appendix B). All articles detail a situation where a man had been
convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to three years in prison, but due to an oversight the
authorities forgot to jail him and he went unpunished. During this time he led a law-abiding life,
until the authorities realized their error and arrested him. We manipulated the objective time
from the crime by stating that the crime had occurred either three years or ten years previously.
Additionally, we attempted to manipulate the race of the man by giving him a name that was
either uniquely “Black” (DeShawn) or “White” (Brad). DeShawn was drawn from Fryer and
Levitt (2004), and was chosen as it was the most statistically likely name to belong to a Black
male. Brad was drawn from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), and was chosen as it was both
identified as statistically likely to belong to a White male, and was the White name most likely to
receive a callback for a job interview in that study. We chose to manipulate implied race only
(rather than reporting race explicitly, including a photo or other identifying details, etc) in Study
1, because we hoped to avoid demand charactersitics and social desirability concerns that could
be evoked by a more blatant manipulation of race.
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Dependent measures. After reading the news article, participants were given a series of
questions about the article (see Appendix E). They were asked to give judgments about both the
person and act detailed in the article on a bipolar scale (e.g., “To what degree is this specific
person/act:”; 1 = good, 7 = bad). In addition they were asked items about their hypothetical
responses if they were to have a relationship with the man (e.g., “How likely would you be to
forgive this person for their act?”; 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely), about his ability to change
(e.g., “This person is a different person now than when they committed the act.”; 1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and about the appropriateness of jail (e.g., “It is unjust to society to
allow this person to go unpunished.”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants
were also asked on a scale of 1-100 the percentage likelihood that the man would commit
another crime, and, if the participant was in a position to hire the man for a job he was qualified
to do, the percentage likelihood that they would hire him. Participants were asked to mark on a
line how subjectively close or far away the original crime felt to them, with the endpoints of the
line being ‘feels very recent’ and ‘feels very long ago’. Participants were asked to make
sentencing decisions for this crime. They were asked to indicate, in months and years, what they
felt their ideal, absolute minimum, and absolute maximum jail sentences would be for the crime
at that moment; that is, any criminal sentence that should be served once the Department of
Corrections discovered their error. Finally, they answered two questions on bipolar scales about
factors that led them to make their judgments: “Which factor is more important to you when
making a judgment about a person who committed a crime?”; 1 = the act that was committed, 7
= their behaviour since the act; and “Which factor is more important to you when making a
judgment about consequences for crimes?”; 1 = that criminals are rehabilitated, 7 = that
criminals are punished.
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Manipulation check. As a check of the time manipulation, participants were asked to
recall in what year, and how many years previous, the crime was committed. As a check of the
race manipulation, participants were asked what they thought was the ethnicity of the man in the
article. This was a forced-choice option, where participants could choose ‘other’, but with no ‘I
don’t know’ option (see Appendix F).
Post-manipulation check measures. Participants were again asked to complete the same
three-item implicit theories of morality and three-item general person implicit theories measures
(see Appendix G). Again, we combined the three general personal items and the three morality
items into one six-item variable, given that these six items had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .98, with
separate Alphas of .96 for the morality and .97 for the general person subscales. Participants
were also given the Modern Racism Scale (MRS), adapted from McConahay (1986) (e.g., “Over
the past few years, government and media have shown more consideration for racial and ethnic
minorities than is warranted.”; 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree); this scale had an Alpha
of .93. Scores on the Modern Racism Scale did not differ as a function of race condition (t (188)
= -.71, p = .482), or of race assumed by participants (t (177) = -.15, p = .879). Finally,
participants were asked for their demographic information (see Appendix H).
Results
Race manipulation check. Despite the fact that we used names documented to be
uniquely Black or White, our implied race manipulation did not work as expected. Although the
majority of participants identified the man as the race signaled by his name, a substantial number
-- 55 of the 190 participants (28.9%) -- made an assumption inconsistent with our intended
manipulation. Additionally, these errors did not occur at a consistent rate across the race
conditions. In the Black name condition, only 10.9% of participants made an inconsistent
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assumption (judging race as other than Black), while in the White name condition, 39.1% of
participants made an inconsistent assumption (judging race as other than White). It is worth
noting that in both conditions, the inconsistent assumptions were primarily guessing White rather
than Black (10/14 cases, or 71.4% of all inconsistent guesses) or guessing Black rather than
White (34/41 cases, or 82.9% of all inconsistent guesses); all other inconsistencies were guesses
of Hispanic or ‘other’. A chi-square test of independence performed to examine the relationship
between race condition and inconsistent guessing revealed that participants in the White name
condition were significantly more likely to make assumptions inconsistent with the intended
race, X2 (1, N = 179) = 19.20, p < .001. This pattern of results was found to be independent of
participants’ level of modern racism, implicit theories of change, the time that passed since the
crime, or any other factors examined.
Although this pattern of inconsistent assumptions is potentially interesting (and will be
followed up in another line of research), for the purposes of the present study it is problematic.
Because of this failure in manipulation, we are faced with three potential ways of
conceptualizing race in this particular study. First, we can use assigned race and rely on the
indirect assumption that people may have been influenced at least implicitly to presume race
from names. The drawback to this method is that the manipulation check reveals that in many
cases (and differently across conditions), the manipulation may not have worked, at least when
participants were asked to explicitly identify race at the end of the study. Second, we can use the
assumed race (the race that participants reported thinking the offender was in the manipulation
check); arguably this is the best way to capture what participants were actually thinking about
offender race, but it comes at a cost of losing random assignment. Moreover, it is possible that
participants were not consciously thinking about race until the question was asked, and thus their
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answer at that time might not reflect their answers through the earlier part of the study. Finally,
we could use only those participants who identified the race that was intended; however, there
are different attrition rates between the race conditions, meaning that almost half of the
participants assigned to the White condition would be lost, and there may be important
differences between those who made race judgments consistent with the intended manipulation,
and those who did not. In particular, it is possible that implicit prejudice, rather than explicit,
may account for more stereotypic race categorizations in our study. In work done by Hugenberg
and Bodenhausen (2004), faces that are angry in appearance, and are racially ambiguous, are
more often categorized as Black (the stereotypically “angry” race) by those who are high in
implicit prejudice, while there is no difference in categorization associated with explicit
prejudice. It may be that the tendency to guess a race that was not intended is also the result of
implicit prejudice: in particular, it is conceivable that those who made the assumption that
“Brad” was Black might harbour some negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks, or at least
automatic associations between Blacks and criminality.
We recognize that none of the above choices is ideal. Indeed, a central goal of Study 2 is
to address the ambiguity in race that led to such frequent inconsistent racial attributions.
However, for Study 1, we must select among these imperfect approaches. In the spirit of
thoroughness and full disclosure, we report that analyses were conducted using each of these
race categorizations, and that the clearest and most consistent patterns emerged when examining
the race people reported guessing. This is also consistent with our analysis of which
categorization is most likely to yield interpretable (though tentative) results; we cannot, however,
draw causal conclusions from these results. For the purposes of the thesis, then, all analyses will
be reported using guessed race.
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Analyses. This study contained a number of separate dependent variables capturing
various aspects of moral judgment. A similar analytic strategy was used for each. Initially, a
multiple regression was conducted for each dependent measure, including the following
predictors: implicit theories of change (assessed as a pre-measure); time since the original
offense (3 or 10 years); assumed race of the offender (Black or White); modern racism score
(assessed at the end of the study); and all possible two-, three-, and four-way interactions
between these predictors. Due to concerns about power given our small sample size, as well as a
lack of consistent significant results, the four-way interaction term of Implicit Theories X Time
X Assumed Race X Modern Racism was removed from our multiple regressions. Furthermore,
after conducting analyses with all three-way interaction terms included, we found that none of
these interaction terms showed any consistent, significant pattern; given this fact, as well as the
lack of hypotheses regarding these three-way interactions, we removed these predictors from our
final sets of analyses. We conducted our final multiple regressions by entering Implicit Theories,
Time, Assumed Race of Offender, and Modern Racism in the first step of the regression, and all
two-way interaction terms of the above factors in the second step of the regression. For each
comparison across DVs, we report the analyses in tables for each predicted effect (when effects
are significant). Non-significant, unsupported predictions will be noted in the text.
As a reminder, we have a series of specific predictions to test that can be captured in
various steps of these analyses. First, we expect a main effect of implicit theories, such that
incremental theorists will be more positive about the offender. We expect a main effect of time,
such that judgments may be more favorable 10 years after a crime rather than 3 years. We did
not have a specific prediction for race (we expected that judgments would depend also on
prejudice level); it is possible that judgments would be harsher overall for Black than White
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offenders but we did not specifically hypothesize this pattern. Remaining hypotheses can be
addressed by testing certain interactions. A Time x Implicit Theories interaction would test the
prediction that incremental theorists are more forgiving with the passage of more time. A Race x
Modern Racism interaction will test whether judgments of the same crime vary on the basis of
offender race and prejudice level (we expected that high modern racists would judge the offender
– and the principles surrounding crime and punishment – more harshly when the offender was
Black). This interaction can also test whether implicit theories shift on the basis of race and
prejudice. We had no specific hypotheses for any of the other interactions.
Implicit theories of change. First, we examined whether participants’ pre-existing
implicit theories of change would predict reactions to the news article, by examining the main
effect of implicit theories from our multiple regressions. Consistent with our hypothesis, these
linear regressions revealed a significant effect of implicit theory on numerous dependent
variables, such as punitive or relational opinions about the subject, the likelihood of the subject
reoffending or being hired, and more general opinions about the role of jail as rehabilitative or
punitive (see Table 1). In all cases, a consistent pattern was found, with incremental theorists
reacting more positively to the offender and with a greater preference for rehabilitation over
punishment, while entity theorists reacted more negatively and with support for punishment over
rehabilitation.
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Table 1
Regression Coefficients for Implicit Theories (Pre-measure)
Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
Shame items
.10
.09
Jail items
.24
.17
Change items
.17
.20
Relational items
.16
.16
Person judgments
.12
.11
Act judgments
-.06
-.09
Likelihood to Reoffend
3.42
.20
a
Likelihood to Hire
-6.31
-.24
a
Subjective Distance
.36
.02
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.14
-.14
Preferred Sentence
1.41
.08
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-.24
-.14
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
.41
.25
Post-Study Implicit Theories
.92
.89

t
1.14
2.22
2.63
2.00
1.44
-1.07
2.61
-3.05
.22
-1.80
1.11
-1.81
3.54
23.98

p
.257
.028
.009
.047
.152
.287
.010
.003
.824
.074
.269
.072
.001
< .001

Note: Implicit theories coded so that higher scores equal greater support for entity beliefs; all dependent
variables coded so that higher scores equal more negative judgments unless noted with a superscript
(a Higher scores = more positive overall judgments)

Time. Although we predicted that time might affect judgments, no main effects of time
were found, save for judgments of subjective time, which are highly related to the passage of
calendar time, β = .267, t (168) = 3.730, p < .001. It may be that the times we selected were both
distant enough (especially in light of the rehabilitation information) that any effect of time was
washed out for judgments that were not directly related to time itself.
Race. We did not find any main effects of race on any of our dependent variables.
However, these effects were not predicted in the absence of modern racism scores, and therefore
the interaction between race and modern racism is of greater interest.
Time and Implicit Theories. Although we predicted an interaction between time and
implicit theories, our hypothesis was not supported. No dependent variables were predicted by
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the Time X Implicit Theories interaction. Again, this may be due to the fact that time itself was
not successfully altered in any psychologically meaningful way, perhaps because both times
selected were too distant.
Race and Modern Racism. Next, we examined whether participants’ scores on the
Modern Racism Scale would interact with the perceived race of the offender in predicting
reactions to the article. Specifically, we hypothesized that modern racism scores would not
differentiate reactions for those who had indicated that the man in the article was White, but
would for those who guessed that he was Black, with participants with higher modern racism
scores responding more negatively than those with lower scores. We examined the results of the
Assumed Race X Modern Racism interaction in our previously described multiple linear
regressions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found a significant effect of the Assumed Race
X Modern Racism interaction on numerous dependent measures: punitive and relational beliefs
about the subject; negative judgments of the act and person; the chance of reoffending or hiring;
sentencing of the subject; the weighing of factors in general law decision-making; the feeling of
subjective distance from the event; and post-study implicit theories of change (see Figure 1;
Table 2). A simple slopes analysis revealed that in all cases, modern racism did not predict
responses when the offender was assumed to be White, but did significantly predict responses
(with act judgment being marginally significant at p = .074) when the offender was assumed to
be Black (see Table 3). In many cases, this difference was driven by those high in modern racism
having more negative opinions in the Black condition than the White condition, though in some
cases, there was a reversal, and those low in modern racism would have more positive opinions
in the Black condition than in the White (see Table 4).

21

TIME, IMPLICIT THEORIES, RACE, AND MORAL JUDGMENTS

Percentage Likelihood of Reoffending

What is the likelihood that this person
would commit another crime in the future?
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Low Modern Racism (-1 SD)
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High Modern Racism (+1 SD)
White

Figure 1: Example Graph for Assumed Race X Modern Racism Interaction
Table 2
Beta Values for Race by Modern Racism Interaction
Variable
B (unstandardized)
Shame items
.27
Jail items
.43
Change items
.09
Relational items
.16
Person judgments
.20
Act judgments
.13
Likelihood to Reoffend
5.40
Likelihood to Hire a
-4.47
Subjective Distance a
-5.69
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.22
Preferred Sentence
4.19
Act vs. Behaviour a
-.43
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
.44
Post-Study Implicit Theories
.07
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

β (Standardized)
.25
.32
.10
.17
.19
.19
.20
-.18
-.28
-.23
.26
-.27
.28
.07

t
3.03
4.01
1.34
2.05
2.45
2.24
2.61
-2.17
-3.57
-2.79
3.31
-3.30
3.89
2.02

p
.003
< .001
.181
.042
.015
.027
.010
.031
< .001
.006
.001
.001
< .001
.045
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Table 3
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Modern Racism on the Basis of Assumed Race
Assumed White
Assumed Black
Variable
Low MR High MR Gradient
t
p
Low MR High MR Gradient
t
Shame Items
3.83
3.47
-.14
-.92 .357
2.81
3.84
.39
3.93
Jail Items
4.29
3.53
-.29 -1.67 .096
3.16
4.65
.57
4.82
Relational Items
3.78
3.82
.01
.10 .918
3.56
4.44
.34
3.77
Person Judgements
3.32
3.55
.09
.68 .499
2.83
4.12
.49
4.93
Act Judgements
6.34
5.98
-.14 -.1.47 .145
6.19
6.52
.13
1.80
Likelihood of
20.30
13.65
-2.54 -1.20 .233
11.47
33.06
8.26
5.48
Repeating
Likelihood of Hiring a
50.15
51.23
.41
.12 .902
62.89
40.60
-8.52 -3.58
a
Subjective Distance
68.84
73.21
1.67
.65 .520
78.71
53.30
-9.71 -5.27
Alternatives to Prison a
3.74
3.99
.10
.76 .449
4.32
3.42
-.34 -3.85
Preferred Sentence
16.15
13.03
-1.19
-.58 .563
8.00
26.78
7.18
4.90
a
Act vs. Behaviour
4.12
4.60
.18
.86 .392
5.24
3.46
-.68 -4.59
Rehabilitation vs.
3.13
3.08
-.02
-.10 .918
2.30
4.56
.86
6.43
Punishment
Post-Study Implicit
3.13
3.08
-.02
-.45 .665
2.91
3.26
.13
3.00
Theories
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

p
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.074
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.003
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Table 4
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Assumed Race at Low (-1 SD) or High (+1 SD) Modern Racism
Low (-1 SD) Modern Racism
High (+1 SD) Modern Racism
Variable
White
Black Gradient
t
p
White
Black Gradient
t
Shame Items
3.83
2.81
-.51 -3.26
.001
3.47
3.84
.19
1.17
Jail Items
4.29
3.16
-.56 -2.94
.004
3.53
4.65
.56
2.87
Relational Items
3.78
3.56
-.11
-.81
.422
3.82
4.44
.31
2.24
Person Judgements
3.32
2.83
-.25 -1.67
.097
3.55
4.12
.28
1.88
Act Judgements
6.34
6.19
-.07
-.68
.497
5.98
6.52
.27
2.50
Likelihood of Repeating
20.30
11.47
-4.42 -1.89
.060
13.65
33.06
9.71
4.21
Likelihood of Hiring a
50.15
62.89
6.37
1.73
.086
51.23
40.60
-5.32 -1.46
Subjective Distance a
68.84
78.71
4.94
1.73
.085
73.21
53.30
-9.96 -3.54
Alternatives to Prison a
3.74
4.32
.29
2.09
.038
3.99
3.42
-.29 -2.06
Preferred Sentence
16.15
8.00
-4.08 -1.80
.074
13.03
26.78
6.87
3.07
Act vs. Behaviour a
4.12
5.24
.56
2.36
.019
4.60
3.46
-.57 -2.50
Rehabilitation vs.
3.13
2.30
-.41
2.05
.042
3.08
4.56
.74
3.62
Punishment
Post-Study Implicit
3.13
2.91
.05
.84
.405
3.08
3.26
-.07 -1.18
Theories
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

p
.245
.005
.027
.062
.013
< .001
.146
.001
.041
.002
.013
< .001
.241
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Changing implicit theories of change. We also examined whether scores on the Modern
Racism Scale would interact with the perceived race of the offender in predicting a shift in
implicit theories after being presented with our materials. We hypothesized that participants who
had indicated that the offender was White would not shift their implicit theories between the premeasure and the post-study measure, but that a shift would be seen for those who indicated that
he was Black. Specifically, we predicted that participants with higher modern racism scores
would endorse stronger entity beliefs after reading about an offender who had potentially
changed. We examined the effect of the Assumed Race X Modern Racism interaction on poststudy implicit theories in our previously described multiple linear regression, which included the
pre-measure of implicit theories as a factor.
Consistent with our hypothesis, a linear regression revealed an interaction between
assumed race and modern racism on post-study implicit theories, controlling for pre-study
theories, β = .07, t (168) = 2.02, p = .045 (see Figure 2). A simple slopes analysis revealed that
modern racism scores were a significant predictor of shifts in implicit theories when participants
indicated that the offender was Black, such that those with higher modern racism scores were
more likely to shift toward a more entity theory, t (168) = 3.00, p = .003. Modern racism did not
predict shifts in implicit theories when the offender was assumed to be White.

More Entity
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Post-Study Implicit Theories
(Controlling for Pre-Measure)
3.3
3.2
3.1

More Incremental

3
2.9
2.8
2.7
Low Modern Racism (-1 SD)
Black

High Modern Racism (+1 SD)
White

Figure 2: Graph of Assumed Race X Modern Racism Interaction for Shifts in Implicit Theories
Race and Modern Racism – Moderated Mediation with Subjective Distance. Despite
the passage of time being a key part of the news article that was presented, we found that the
time condition had little effect on participant responses. Why might this be? We have found
evidence in previous research that the actual passage of time since a moral or interpersonal
transgression is less important than one’s subjective sense of time: how recent or distant those
transgressions subjectively felt (Williams & Wilson, 2014). With this in mind, and noticing that
the interaction between modern racism scores and assumed race was significantly related to
people’s perception of subjective distance from the crime perpetrated (β = -.28, t (168) = -3.57, p
< .001; see Table 2), we hypothesized that subjective time may mediate the effect of the Race X
Modern Racism interaction on the other dependent variables that were examined.
Remembering that the simple slopes of the Race X Modern Racism interaction showed
that there was no significant difference between those low and high in modern racism when the
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offender was assumed White, our model can be conceptualized as one of moderated mediation,
with modern racism score as the independent variable, assumed race as the moderator, subjective
distance as the mediator, and any of the previous dependent variables testable as the dependent
variable in the model (see Figure 3). Because of how the race moderation is expected to work,
this model could also be broken down into two identical models with differing results: one for
participants who have assumed the offender is Black, and one where they have assumed he is
White. Per our simple slopes, we would expect that the former model would be a significant
mediation, while the latter would not be significant (see Table 3).
Because calendar time and subjective time are generally related (though not as highly as
might often be expected), we included the time condition as a covariate. In addition, we included
pre-study implicit theories of change as a covariate, as implicit theories did predict people’s
responses to many of the same dependent variables independent of the race X modern racism
interaction2.
Using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), we ran an analysis of a moderated
mediation model (Model 8), with modern racism as the independent variable, assumed race as
the moderator, subjective distance as the mediator, and both time and pre-study implicit theories
as covariates. For our dependent variable, we tested all variables that were significantly predicted
by the Race X Modern Racism interaction, aside from subjective distance (see Table 3).
The results of this analysis supported our hypothesis (see Table 8). For our shame and guilt, jail,
and relational items; person judgments; likelihood of reoffending and hiring; preferred sentence
length; general crime and punishment principles; and post-study measure of implicit theories, we
2

We considered whether implicit theories could serve as a moderator of subjective distance (where incremental
theorists, who believe that change can occur over time, may react more positively to greater perceived distance
from the event), but found that it did not work, and would serve best as a covariate.
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found a consistent pattern of results. Modern racism, moderated by assumed race, had a negative
relationship with subjective distance; that is, those with higher modern racism scores (who
assumed the perpetrator was Black, rather than White) were more likely to feel subjectively close
to the original crime. Subjective distance, in turn, had a negative relationship with the dependent
variables, whereby those who felt subjectively closer to the crime had more negative feelings
about the offender; believed his negative behaviour was more likely to continue into the future;
were more punitive towards him; and adopted more punitive principles when discussing crime in
general, separate from the discussed case. In addition, this mediation model suggests one
potential explanation for the mechanism behind shifting implicit theories: those who felt
subjectively close to the original crime were more likely to shift towards an entity perspective
when asked about their implicit theories after the manipulation, while those who felt subjectively
far shifted towards an incremental perspective.

Overall Model
Assumed Race

Subjective
Distance

Modern
Racism

Figure 3: Diagram for Overall Mediation Model

Controlling for
Time, pre-test
Implicit Theories

Dependent
Variable
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Assumed Black
Subjective
Distance

Modern
Racism

Controlling for
Time, pre-test
Implicit Theories

Dependent
Variable

Figure 4: Diagram for Mediation Model, Assumed Black Only

Assumed White
Subjective
Distance

Modern
Racism

Controlling for
Time, pre-test
Implicit Theories

Dependent
Variable

Figure 5: Diagram for Mediation Model, Assumed White Only
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Table 5
Path Results and Confidence Intervals for Overall Mediation
DV
a
b
B
SE
B
SE
Jail Items
-8.65** 2.99
-.02*** .005
Shame Items
-8.65** 2.99
-.02** .004
Relational Items
-8.65** 2.99
-.02*** .003
Person Judgments
-8.65** 2.99
-.02*** .004
Likelihood of
-8.65** 2.99
-.37***
.05
Repeating
Likelihood of
-8.65** 2.99
.49***
.09
a
Hiring
Preferred Sentence
-8.65** 2.99
-.22***
.06
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-8.65** 2.99
.03***
.01
Rehabilitation vs.
-8.65** 2.99
-.02***
.01
Punishment
Post-Study Implicit
-8.65** 2.99
-.004* .002
Theories
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments
†p < .10 *p < .05. **p < .01, ***p < .001.

c'
B
.61**
.40*
.16
.23
6.22**

SE
.19
.16
.13
.15
2.21

Indirect Effect
B
SE
CI
.21
.09
[.05, .38]
.13
.06
[.02, .27]
.18
.07
[.04, .33]
.15
.07
[.03, .30]
3.22
1.38
[.75, 6.14]

-3.38

3.61

-4.21

1.66

[-7.61, -1.15]

7.06 **
-.54*
.59**

2.35
.23
.21

1.90
-.28
.16

.96
.11
.08

[.35, 4.06]
[-.52, -.07]
[.03, .33]

.08

.07

.04

.02

[.0048, .09]
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Table 6
Path Results and Confidence Intervals for Mediation: Assumed Black Only
DV
a
b
c'
B
SE
B
SE
B
Jail Items
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.02***
.01
.32**
Shame Items
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.01**
.005
.27**
Relational Items
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.02***
.004
.16†
Person Judgments
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.02***
.005
.33***
Likelihood of
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.38***
.07
4.59**
Repeating
Likelihood of
-9.40 ***
1.88
.47***
.10
-3.66
a
Hiring
Preferred Sentence
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.26***
.07
5.83***
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-9.40 ***
1.88
.03***
.01
-.36*
Rehabilitation vs.
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.02**
.01
.62***
Punishment
Post-Study Implicit
-9.40 ***
1.88
-.004
.002
.09*
Theories
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments
†p < .10 *p < .05. **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Indirect Effect
SE
CI
.07
[.10, .36]
.05
[.04, .24]
.06
[.08, .30]
.06
[.06, .27]
1.04
[1.42, 5.47]

SE
.12
.10
.08
.09
1.37

B
.21
.13
.18
.15
3.24

2.23

-4.23

1.33

[-7.02, -1.80]

1.45
.14
.13

1.91
-.29
.16

.78
.09
.07

[.56, 3.56]
[-.47, -.13]
[.05, .30]

.04

.04

.02

[.01, .08]
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Table 7
Path Results and Confidence Intervals for Mediation: Assumed White Only
DV
a
b
B
SE
B
SE
Jail Items
1.54
2.27
-.03***
.01
Shame Items
1.54
2.27
-.02**
.01
Relational Items
1.54
2.27
-.03***
.01
Person Judgments
1.54
2.27
-.02**
.01
Likelihood of
1.54
2.27
-.32**
.09
Repeating
Likelihood of
1.54
2.27
.53**
.19
a
Hiring
Preferred Sentence
1.54
2.27
-.13
.13
a
Act vs. Behaviour
1.54
2.27
.04***
.01
Rehabilitation vs.
1.54
2.27
-.02*
.01
Punishment
Post-Study Implicit
1.54
2.27
-.01*
.003
Theories
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments
†p < .10 *p < .05. **p < .01, ***p < .001.

c'
B
-.29†
-.13
-.004
.10
-1.63

SE
.15
.13
.11
.12
1.81

Indirect Effect
B
SE
CI
.001
.05
[-.09, .13]
.001
.03
[-.06, .08]
.001
.05
[-.08, .10]
.001
.04
[-.07, .08]
.01
.84 [-1.49, 1.85]

-.28

2.95

-.02

-1.23
.18
.03

1.92
.19
.17

.01
-.001
.001

.50
.08
.04

[-.92, 1.08]
[-.17, .13]
[-.08, .09]

.01

.06

.0002

.01

[-.02, .02]

1.08 [-2.40, 1.80]
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Discussion
As predicted, participants who initially endorsed incremental beliefs did respond with
more positive judgments about past offenders than those who endorsed entity beliefs.
Incremental theorists also reported a greater degree of support for rehabilitative (rather than
punitive) measures, both in regards to the specific crime as well as justice principles more
generally. These findings both appear to be in line with previous research by Chiu et al. (1997),
Miller, Burgoon, and Hall (2007), and Gervey et al. (1999), and extend this research by applying
it to a distant past, rather than present, moral transgression. In addition, consistent with Leith et
al. (2014), we did find that participants shifted their support for implicit theories in a manner
consistent with a motivated interpretation; only when the offender was Black did participants
shift their implicit theories, with participants who scored high on the Modern Racism Scale
shifting to a more entity perspective. These findings suggest that, whether to reaffirm their preexisting prejudices in the face of change, or to remain vigilant against a perceived threat, people
may temporarily shift their core beliefs about personal and moral stability. Given the inequitable
treatment of Blacks and other racial minorities in the United States, Canada, and beyond, and
alongside the findings that entity beliefs predict harsher treatment and more punitive justice
principles, this shifting of implicit theories could be one cause of major, unintended negative
consequences for minorities in criminal contexts. That is, not only do individuals who initially
supported an entity theory stand to make harsh judgments, but others who do not typically hold
this perspective on the nature of change might be inclined to shift their views to be less accepting
of the possibility of change.
We did not find support for our hypotheses that an increase in the passage of time (3 vs
10 years) would cause more positive judgments, nor that incremental theorists would be
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particularly sensitive to the effects of time. It may be that both 3 and 10 years were long enough
– especially when paired with evidence of rehabilitation – to be equally convincing that change
may have occurred. This may suggest that these conditions may need to be contrasted to a
present or very recent past condition in order to assess the role of time in regards to implicit
theories more clearly. However, although calendar time did not matter in this study, we did
discover a very interesting pattern of results when looking at subjective time, and how it was
related to race and modern racism.
As expected, we discovered an interaction between the assumed race of the perpetrator
and the level of modern racism reported by participants that predicted many of our dependent
variables. Specifically, reported modern racism predicted responses to judgments of the offender
and of general crime when the offender was assumed to be Black (but not White): participants
with higher modern racism scores were usually significantly harsher when making judgments
about a Black (versus White) offender, while participants with lower modern racism scores
would sometimes show a reversal and judge the Black offender less harshly than the White one.
One additional dependent variable that demonstrated this same pattern was the subjective
distance felt from the crime; modern racism was related to subjective distance when the offender
was Black, and participants higher in modern racism felt closer to a crime when it was
committed by a Black offender than a White one (the reverse was found for those low in modern
racism, albeit marginally so).
We also discovered that while calendar time may affect little in people’s judgments,
subjective time may play a key role in mediating the relationship between modern racism and
race, and people’s judgments of both criminal offenders, and the basic legal principles that guide
those judgments. When faced with a Black offender, a person’s level of modern racism predicts
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the perceived distance from the original crime, where those with greater modern racism feel
subjectively closer to the crime, regardless of the actual time that has passed. This subjective
closeness, in turn, is highly related to both personal judgments of the offender, and legal
principles, whereby people who feel very close to the original event also have harsher judgments
of the offender, feel that he should be punished to a greater extent, and also support more
punitive principles when it comes to crime in general. In addition, this model may also
demonstrate one of the reasons why people may strategically shift their implicit theories: feeling
subjectively close to the original transgression also predicts a greater shift towards an entity
perspective when asked to report beliefs after reading about that transgression.
Study 2
Study 2 was constructed as a replication and extension of Study 1, with the goal of
addressing several of the flaws that occurred in the original study. The key improvements that
were implemented in Study 2 were 1) to include a very recent past condition (because the 3 vs 10
year conditions did not differ), 2) to augment the race name manipulation because of our initial
lack of success in manipulating race, 3) to include an ‘I don’t know’ response in the race
manipulation check (because it is possible that some of the mis-guessing in Study 1 could have
been as a result of not knowing or remembering race at all), and 4) to alter the order of the postmanipulation check implicit theories measure, in order to better assess how implicit theories shift
(in Study 1 this measure was relegated to the end of the questionnaire even after manipulation
checks).
Participants. We recruited 122 participants from Wilfrid Laurier University’s PREP
pool for course credit, while an additional 469 participants were recruited from CrowdFlower for
$1.00 as compensation. 83 participants who self-identified as having not paid attention to the
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task, or who failed an attention check, were excluded, as were the additional results of 73
CrowdFlower participants who participated in the study more than once (though their initial
participation in the study was retained for analysis). In total, 435 participants (266 females; M age
= 34.3, SD = 12.9, range = 18-74; 350 White, 22 Black, 16 Chinese, 15 Hispanic, 32 other)
remained in the final analysis.
Method. Study 2 was a direct methodological replication of Study 1, with several small
differences. This study introduced a control condition, which described an arrest and sentencing
in the immediate past, within two months of the study time period (see Appendix C). The names
used were also changed to Jamal Washington (“Black”) or Brett McCarthy (“White”), in order to
directly replicate the naming methodology used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), where
these first and last names were pilot tested for several features, including race, and were
accurately identified as their intended race. One additional repetition of the first name was added
to the end of the article. The second measure of implicit theories was moved to be directly after
the dependent variables, but before the manipulation checks, as there was some concern that
asking for participants’ racial assumptions could affect their answers on the implicit theories
measure. The final change in Study 2 was to add an ‘I don’t know’ option to the race
manipulation check. This was done in order to address concerns that participants may have been
guessing the man’s race at random, as there was no option to choose if they truly could not
remember his race.
Race Manipulation Check. Once again, despite our attempts to strengthen the racename manipulation, our race manipulation did not work as had been reported in prior research.
Only 56.1% of participants identified the man in question as the race that was intended. Guesses
inconsistent with what was intended were made by 12.2% of participants, while 31.7% of
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participants claimed to have no guess as to the race of the offender. Once again, these errors did
not occur consistently across race conditions: while 61.5% of participants identified the intended
race in the Black condition, only 51.1% of participants identified the intended race in the White
condition. A chi-square test of independence performed to examine the relationship between race
condition and accuracy revealed that this was a significant difference, X2 (1, N = 435) = 4.81, p =
.028. This difference in accuracy rate is reflected by participants who reported that they “did not
know” the man’s race, rather than those who guessed incorrectly: 36.6% of participants did not
know the race of the White named offender, while only 26.4% of participants did not know the
race of the Black named offender (the percentages of inconsistent guesses are 12.3% for the
Black name and 12.0% for the White name).
Unfortunately, the issues with this improper race manipulation rendered this data set even
more difficult to interpret. With close to half of respondents declining to guess the man’s race, it
seems clear that the race manipulation did not work as intended. Much like our prior study,
analyses conducted using the assigned race condition as a factor did not show any clear pattern
of results. Additionally, unlike in the prior study, it is problematic to run statistical analyses
based on the race that participants assumed (consistent with our intentions or not), given the
large number of ‘I don’t know’ responses. We cannot know how many participants truly did not
know, how many chose not to answer because they did not want to reveal their true belief, and,
for those individuals, whether that belief would have been correct or incorrect.
Due to this second failure of race manipulation, we have concluded that a race name
manipulation is not an appropriate means of assigning a race condition to participants in future
studies. This may be due to the crime context of these studies, as we drew on past race name
studies which used neutral to positive stimuli. This may be an interesting phenomenon in its own
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right but beyond the scope of the thesis itself. Due to the problems in clarifying participant race
assumptions, we chose not to perform further analyses on this data set that involve race.
Implicit theories of change. We did examine whether participants’ pre-existing implicit
theories of change would again predict reactions to the news article, by examining the main
effect of implicit theories from our multiple regressions on the same dependent variables. Results
were mixed in this study, with significant or marginal effects found for change items, the
likelihood of the subject reoffending or being hired, subjective distance from the original crime,
prison alternatives, and role of jail being rehabilitative or punitive (see Table 8). In all cases,
findings were in line with those from Study 1, with incremental theorists being more forgiving.
Table 8
Regression Coefficients for Implicit Theories (Pre-measure)
Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
Shame items
.09
.08
Jail items
.10
.08
Change items
.20
.22
Relational items
.04
.04
Person judgments
.01
.01
Act judgments
.03
.04
Likelihood to Reoffend
4.09
.22
a
Likelihood to Hire
-5.80
-.23
a
Subjective Distance
-3.11
-.14
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.14
-.15
Preferred Sentence
1.69
.09
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-.18
-.10
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
.22
.13
Post-Study Implicit Theories
.91
.87

t
1.05
.94
2.77
.55
.08
.54
2.77
-2.97
-1.74
-1.92
1.18
-1.30
1.67
21.55

p
.294
.349
.006
.581
.937
.588
.006
.003
.084
.056
.240
.196
.098
< .001

Note: Implicit theories coded so that higher scores equal greater support for entity beliefs; all dependent
variables coded so that higher scores equal more negative judgments unless noted with a superscript
(a Higher scores = more positive overall judgments)
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Study 3
Study 3 was constructed as a replication and improvement of both Study 1 and Study 2,
in order to replicate the results found in the first study, while correcting the methodological
issues present both in the first study and in our attempt at a follow-up study. Specifically, we
aimed to combat the numerous difficulties encountered in accurately manipulating the race of the
offender via racially cued names. Though this may be an important research question to explore,
in the context of our studies, it has only lead to ambiguity in interpreting results because we have
been unable to reliably manipulate race. We manipulated race unambiguously by adding an overt
cue – a photo of the offender. We also retained some changes made in the second study,
specifically by including a recent past condition, and by altering the placement of the second
implicit theories measure. We also altered the placement of the subjective time measure, so as to
more confidently use it as a mediator in our analyses.
Participants. Four hundred American residents were recruited from the CrowdFlower
website, with $1.00 for compensation. One hundred and ten participants who self-identified as
having not paid attention to the task, or who failed two of the three attention check questions,
were excluded, while 18 other participants were excluded for reporting an incorrect race for the
offender (see below). In total, 272 participants (154 females; M age = 37.3, SD = 12.8, range = 1875; 213 White, 19 Hispanic, 12 Chinese, 8 Black, 20 other) remained in the final analysis.
Method. Participants were invited to participate in a study investigating judgments of
news articles, and were presented with the same introductory questionnaire including six
embedded implicit theory questions. Finding a Cronbach’s Alpha of .95, we again chose to

TIME, IMPLICIT THEORIES, RACE, AND MORAL JUDGMENTS

39

combine all six items into one implicit theories variable.3 They were then presented with one of
the possible news articles, which contained text identical to the articles detailed in Study 1 and 2,
save for the name of the offender. All participants read about a crime happening at one of three
possible dates: the crime detailed in the article occurred either three or ten years in the past, or in
the immediate past (within two months of the study period). When the crime occurred in the
recent past however, only the crime and not evidence of rehabilitation was presented. This allows
us to examine how people respond to the crime itself when not paired with purported change
over time, though it makes the conditions qualitatively unequal in regard to rehabilitation
information.
In order to manipulate race, at the beginning of each article we included a mugshot of a
male in his 20s (said to be taken at the time of the original crime), who was either Black or
White. Each race condition included seven mugshots, one of which was randomly selected for
the article read (see Appendix D). Unlike previous studies, no race name manipulation was
attempted – in every article, the offender was named Steve Williams – in order to keep potential
socioeconomic status naming factors consistent across race conditions.
After reading the news article, participants were first presented with the question asking
for their perception of subjective distance from the event. This was moved before the other
dependent measures so that it could again be used as a mediator in statistical analyses. This was
followed by the same series of questions, asking about their opinions of the offender and the
crime, their estimates of re-offense or hiring likelihoods, their sentencing decisions, and their
support for general legal principles. Participants then completed the same six items assessing
implicit theories (α = .97), followed by the Modern Racism Scale (α = .87), immediately after the
3

The Cronbach’s Alpha of the three implicit theories of morality questions was .89; the Alpha for the three general
person questions was .91.
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dependent variables, but prior to the manipulation check questionnaires.4 They were then asked
the same manipulation check questions. When asked about the participant’s race, ‘I don’t know’
was not included, due to the high numbers of participants in the previous study who chose that
option in lieu of not responding. Finally, participants were asked for demographic information.
Race manipulation check. We examined our attention check questions to see if, unlike
previous studies, our photographic race manipulation had worked. We found that 18 of 290
participants failed to provide the appropriate race of the offender when asked. Incorrect answers
were evenly split across the two race conditions. Due to the much less ambiguous race condition,
and the low number of incorrect answers, this was seen as a failure of attention rather than an
ineffective race manipulation, and those 18 participants were also excluded. Therefore, in total,
272 participants remained in the final analyses.
Results
We performed several multiple linear regressions to predict our dependent variables,
using as predictors implicit theories, time condition, race of offender, and modern racism score,
as well as the interaction terms of all the above factors. Time was compared in two different
ways in this study: in one set of analyses, in order to directly examine the two conditions that
served as replications of Study 1, we compared those in the three year condition to those in the
ten year condition, excluding the new “recent” condition from our analyses. This will be referred
to as the ‘3 vs. 10 Years’ time variable5. If we find, as in Study 1, that participants in the 3 and
10 Years conditions do not differ statistically from one another for the majority of our dependent

4

We found no differences between the White and Black race conditions for modern racism scores, t (270) = -.236,
p = .814; because our race manipulation appeared to not affect modern racism scores, we feel confident in using
those scores as an independent variable.
5
Analyses conducted using the 3 vs 10 Year variable have an N of 174.
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variables, we will plan to collapse these two conditions into one group labeled the “Far”
condition. In the second set of analyses, we will compare participants in the new “Recent”
condition to those in the collapsed “Far” condition (composed of both the three and ten year
conditions). This will be referred to as the ‘Near vs. Far’ time variable6. For ease of presentation
and because these analyses allow us to accomplish the two central types of analyses most clearly,
we will plan to conduct these two sets of analyses consecutively: first, testing differences
between 3 and 10 years, then testing “Near” vs. the collapsed “Far” condition.
Due to concerns about power given our small sample size, the four-way interaction term
of Implicit Theories X Time X Race X Modern Racism was removed from our multiple
regressions. After analyses with all three-way interaction terms included, we found that only one
term, Implicit Theories X Race X Modern Racism, showed any significant and consistent pattern
among our dependent variables; if any other three-way interactions appeared, they were sporadic,
often only present in one or two of our dependent variables, and had unpredictable patterns. Due
to these facts, as well as a lack of hypotheses regarding any of these three-way interactions, and
the previously-mentioned low power, we conducted our final multiple regressions by entering
Implicit Theories, Time (either 3 vs 10 Years or Near vs. Far), Race of Offender, and Modern
Racism, all two-way interaction terms of the above factors, and the Implicit Theories X Race X
Modern Racism interaction term.
We are primarily testing the same predictions that were made for Study 1. We expect a
main effect of implicit theories, such that incremental theorists respond more positively towards
6

We acknowledge that the passage of time (two months, or 3 or 10 years) is not the only factor that distinguishes
the articles. The recent article speaks of an offender who has been jailed within an appropriate time frame, who is
not disputing his incarceration, and has not shown any evidence of having changed in the time that has passed
since the original crime. In addition, the recent article is considerably shorter than the distant articles (125 words
vs. 327 words). Any of the above factors may contribute to significant differences between the near and far
conditions; more research must be done in order to determine what, exactly, shapes these differences.
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the offender. We also expect a main effect of time, such that judgments will be most negative
when the crime was committed most recently; due to the addition of a recent past condition, we
expect that this condition will lead to more negativity than either of the more distant (3 or 10
year) conditions. Similarly, we again predict that the passage of time will lead incremental
theorists to be most forgiving, which would be captured in a Time X Implicit Theories
interaction, but as we have previously found few differences between three and ten years, this
may be present only when comparing the recent and distant time conditions. Finally, we expect a
Race X Modern Racism interaction, such that those high in modern racism will respond most
negatively to the Black offender; however, we are less confident in this prediction, given the
overt nature of our race manipulation in this study. Though we needed to abandon our subtle race
manipulations, given our prior difficulty, a more overt manipulation comes with its own
concerns, and if participants are more conscious of the racial questions that our study seeks to
answer, social desirability concerns may wash out the effect of modern racism.
Implicit theories of change. We examined whether participants’ pre-existing implicit
theories of change would predict reactions to the news article, by examining the main effect of
implicit theories from our multiple regressions. Consistent with our prior results, when only the 3
and 10 Year conditions were examined, there was a significant effect of implicit theories on our
dependent variables, such that incremental theorists reacted more positively to the subject of the
article, thought he was less likely to reoffend, were more likely to hire him, and more generally
preferred rehabilitation over punishment and highlighted behaviour after a criminal act as more
important than the act itself (see Table 9). Unlike Study 1, we found that implicit theories did not
predict participant acceptance of less harsh alternatives to prison, and found that implicit theories
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did predict judgments of the person as bad or immoral, with incremental theorists less likely to
endorse those labels.

Similar patterns were found when examining all time conditions (see Table 10). Implicit
theories did not predict the endorsement of jail items, and person judgments were only
marginally significant. Both results did trend in the same direction as before, however, indicating
that while the inclusion of the present condition appeared to have dampened the relation between
implicit theories and judgment somewhat, incremental theorists may still be more lenient even
when little time has passed.
Table 9
Regression Coefficients for Implicit Theories (Pre-measure), 3 or 10 Years Only
Dependent Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
t
Shame items
.13
.12
1.43
Jail items
.21
.16
2.28
Change items
.33
.38
5.30
Relational items
.34
.32
4.32
Person judgments
.23
.21
2.76
Act judgments
-.11
-.12
-1.51
a
Subjective distance
-.01
.00
-.01
Likelihood to Reoffend
6.75
.35
4.76
a
Likelihood to Hire
-9.31
-.37
-5.02
Sentencing
1.97
.10
1.23
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.03
-.03
-.38
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-.44
-.26
-3.40
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
.52
.33
4.71
Post-study implicit theories
.98
.92
29.60

p
.154
.024
< .001
< .001
.007
.134
.996
< .001
< .001
.222
.703
.001
< .001
< .001

Note: Implicit theories coded so that higher scores equal greater support for entity beliefs; all dependent
variables coded so that higher scores equal more negative judgments unless noted with a superscript
(a Higher scores = more positive overall judgments)
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Table 10
Regression Coefficients for Implicit Theories (Pre-measure), Near vs. Far
Dependent Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
Shame items
.03
.02
Jail items
.17
.14
Change items
.22
.21
Relational items
.23
.20
Person judgments
.17
.13
Act judgments
-.13
-.15
a
Subjective distance
-.38
-.01
Likelihood to Reoffend
5.68
.23
a
Likelihood to Hire
-4.80
-.19
Sentencing
2.21
.08
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.05
-.04
a
Act vs. Behaviour
-.43
-.25
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
.43
.26
Post-study implicit theories
.99
.93

t
.36
2.27
4.00
3.54
2.45
-2.07
-.23
4.64
-2.99
1.13
-.66
-4.00
4.45
35.87

p
.722
.024
< .001
< .001
.015
.039
.819
< .001
.003
.258
.507
< .001
< .001
< .001

Note: Implicit theories coded so that higher scores equal greater support for entity beliefs; all dependent
variables coded so that higher scores equal more negative judgments unless noted with a superscript
(a Higher scores = more positive overall judgments)

Time. We examined the role of time, looking at the main effects of time for both the 3
and 10 Year conditions (to be consistent with Study 1), and the Near and Far (3 and 10 Years
combined) conditions. In this study, we found that there were few significant differences
between the 3 and 10 Year conditions; aside from replicating our subjective distance finding,
time had a significant effect on judgments of jail appropriateness, change, and likelihood of reoffense (see Table 11). In all cases, judgments were more positive when ten years had passed
than when only three years had passed.
We found more consistent results when evaluating the differences between the recent and
distant conditions. For all dependent variables, save for act judgments and recommended prison
sentence, the time condition was a significant predictor of responses (see Table 12). Again,
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judgments were more positive when more time had passed (either three or ten years), and more
negative when the incident was located in the recent past.
Table 11
Regression Coefficients for Time, 3 vs. 10 Years
Dependent Variable
B (unstandardized)
Shame items
-.07
Jail items
-.32
Change items
-.14
Relational items
-.08
Person judgments
.00
Act judgments
.08
a
Subjective distance
5.71
Likelihood to Reoffend
-3.31
a
Likelihood to Hire
2.62
Sentencing
-3.04
a
Alternatives to Prison
-.11
a
Act vs. Behaviour
.11
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
-.16
Post-study implicit theories
-.07
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

β (Standardized)
-.05
-.22
-.14
-.07
.00
.08
.20
-.15
.09
-.13
-.10
.06
-.08
-.05

t
-.68
-3.25
-2.11
-.95
.01
1.00
2.69
-2.16
1.30
-1.74
-1.36
.79
-1.31
-1.85

p
.500
.001
.037
.343
.996
.320
.008
.033
.196
.083
.175
.429
.191
.066
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Table 12
Regression Coefficients for Time, Near (2 Months) vs. Far (3 and 10 Years Collapsed)
Dependent Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
t
Shame items
-.17
-.13
-2.11
Jail items
-.59
-.38
-6.96
Change items
-.65
-.50
-10.75
Relational items
-.59
-.43
-8.19
Person judgments
-.94
-.58
-12.44
Act judgments
-.05
-.05
-.73
a
Subjective distance
14.15
.433
7.62
Likelihood to Reoffend
-17.37
-.57
-12.67
a
Likelihood to Hire
5.05
.16
2.81
Sentencing
-.91
-.03
-.42
a
Alternatives to Prison
.37
.29
4.86
a
Act vs. Behaviour
.38
.18
3.12
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
-.33
-.16
-3.03
Post-study implicit theories
-.09
-.07
-2.95

p
.036
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
.468
< .001
< .001
.005
.675
< .001
.002
.003
.003

Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

Race and modern racism. Next, we examined whether, consistent with Study 1,
participants’ scores on the Modern Racism Scale would interact with the race of the offender
picture attached to the news article; specifically, that modern racism scores would not predict
reactions for participants who viewed a White picture, but would predict reactions for those who
viewed a Black picture, with those higher in modern racism having more negative reactions. To
do this, we examined the results of the Race X Modern Racism interaction as in our previously
described multiple linear regressions. We found that our results were not replicated. When
looking at only the 3 or 10 Year conditions, only subjective distance was significantly predicted
by the Race X Modern Racism interaction, β = .184, t (162) = 2.30, p = .023, while two
dependent variables were marginally predicted, preferred sentence (β = -.149, t (162) = -1.86, p =
.064) and prison alternatives (β = .-.149, t (162) = -1.87, p = .063). A simple slopes analysis
revealed that only prison alternatives had a similar pattern of results as in Study 1, with modern
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racism predicting responses in the Black condition only, but this difference was driven by low
modern racists endorsing these more lenient alternatives for Black offenders versus White; there
were no differences between race conditions for high modern racists (see Table 13).
Interestingly, a reversal in this pattern was captured for the subjective distance and preferred
sentence dependent variables. In both cases, differences were due to low modern racists reacting
more positively to the White offender than the Black offender. When including responses to the
recent article, this pattern was also found for subjective distance (β = .140, t (250) = 2.29, p =
.023), which was the only variable predicted by Race X Modern Racism when all times were
included in the analysis (see Table 14). We will speculate on the causes of these results further
on.
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Table 13
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Modern Racism by Race Condition; Race by Low (-1 SD) or High (+1 SD) Modern Racism
(3 VS 10 Years Only)
White
Black
Variable
Low MR High MR Gradient
t
p
Low MR High MR Gradient
t
p
a
Subjective Distance
71.24
54.21
-7.72 -9.92 < .001
53.43
57.24
1.73
.41 .680
Alternatives to Prison a
3.53
3.79
-.05 -1.61
.109
4.31
3.92
-.35 -2.21 .029
Preferred Sentence
16.93
24.06
3.23
5.05 < .001
29.14
22.36
-3.07
-.89 .374
Low MR
High MR
Variable
White
Black Gradient
t
p
White
Black Gradient
t
p
Subjective Distance a
71.24
53.43
-8.90
-10.75 < .001
54.21
57.24
1.52
.35 .727
Alternatives to Prison a
3.53
4.31
.13
3.97 <.001
3.79
3.92
-.20 -1.20 .231
Preferred Sentence
16.93
29.14
5.80
9.01 < .001
24.06
22.36
-.52
-.15 .878
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

Table 14
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Modern Racism by Race Condition; and Race by Low (-1 SD) or High (+1 SD) Modern
Racism (All Times Included)
White
Black
Variable
Low
High
Gradient
t
p
Low MR High MR
Gradient
t
p
MR
MR
Subjective Distance a
51.88
40.67
-5.03 -2.05 .042
38.09
44.15
2.72
1.09
.276
Low MR
High MR
Variable
White
Black
Gradient
t
p
White
Black
Gradient
t
p
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Subjective Distance a
51.88
38.09
-6.90 -2.56 .011
40.67
44.15
1.74
.65
.514
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments
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Changing Theories of Change. We also examined whether scores on the Modern
Racism Scale would again interact with offender race in predicting a shift in implicit theories
after being presented with our materials, through the same Race X Modern Racism interaction,
on post-study implicit theories. We did find a marginally significant interaction between race and
modern racism, both when including participants from only the two distant conditions (β = -.06, t
(162) = -1.85, p = .066), and when all participants, including the recent condition participants,
were included (β = -.05, t (250) = -1.94, p = .054). However, as with our previous Race X
Modern Racism findings in Study 3, these differences were due to low modern racists reacting
more positively to the White offender than the Black offender, which represented a reversal from
our prior findings.
Race and Modern Racism – Moderated Mediation with Subjective Distance.
Because the relationship between the Race X Modern Racism interaction and subjective distance
was not consistent with our findings in Study 1, and because the Race X Modern Racism
interaction was not significantly related to any other dependent variables, we could not
meaningfully test whether subjective distance would mediate the relationship between the
interaction and our other dependent variables. It is worth noting, however, that running partial
correlations between subjective distance and the dependent variables that were used in the
mediation model in Study 1, controlling for time condition, implicit theories, race, and modern
racism, revealed significant correlations between subjective distance and all but two of the
dependent variables (see Table 15). Thus, it does appear that subjective distance still plays a role
in how people form judgments about the offender, despite the fact that we could not establish the
same pattern in regards to how it was previously predicted by race.
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Table 15
Partial Correlations Between Subjective Distance and Dependent Variables, Controlling for
Time Condition, Implicit Theories, Race, and Modern Racism
3 vs. 10 Years
Near vs. Far
Dependent Variable
Correlation
p
Correlation
p
Shame Items
-0.09
.139
-0.02
.755
Jail Items
-0.37
< .001
-0.31
< .001
Relational Items
-0.25
< .001
-0.20
.008
Person Judgments
-0.32
< .001
-0.31
< .001
Likelihood of Repeating
-0.20
.001
-0.18
.016
Likelihood of Hiring a
0.20
.001
0.19
.015
Preferred Sentence
0.06
.378
-0.05
.504
Act vs. Behaviour a
0.24
< .001
0.19
.015
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
-0.13
.037
-0.16
.042
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

Time and Implicit Theories. One of our initial research questions was whether
individuals holding different implicit theories would differ in their responses over time, where
incremental theorists would be more accepting as time passed, whereas the judgment of entity
theorists would be less sensitive to the passage of time. When examining the linear multiple
regression as described earlier, looking at time as a Near vs. Far dichotomous variable, we found
a significant Time X Implicit Theories interaction on three dependent variables: change items,
relational items, and the likelihood of hiring (see Table 16). A simple slopes analysis revealed
that while incremental and entity theorists did not differ in their responses when the newspaper
was set in a recent time period, two months before the study, (all p’s >.40), they did differ
significantly in the more distant time period, three or ten years before the study (all t’s > 4.77, all
p’s < .001), with incremental theorists responding significantly more positively than entity
theorists (see Table 17). Both incremental and entity theorists were more positive in the distant
time period than in the recent one (all p’s < .001), save for entity theorists responding to the
hiring likelihood items (p = .934; see Table 18); the differences between incremental and entity
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theorists were driven by incremental theorists being even more positive in the distant condition
than entity theorists.

Likelihood of Hiring Offender After Sentence Complete
Percentage Likelihood of Hiring

70
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40
30
20
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Entity (+1 SD)
Near

Far

Figure 6: Example Graph for Time (Near vs. Far) X Implicit Theories Interaction
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Table 16
Regression Coefficients for Time (Near vs. Far) X Implicit Theories (Pre-measure)
Variable
B
β
t
Change Items
.17
.16
3.06
Relational Items
.14
.13
2.19
a
Likelihood of Hiring
-4.56
-.18
-2.78

p
.002
.030
.006

Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

Table 17
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Implicit Theories by Time Condition (Near vs. Far)
Near
Variable
Incr
Entity Gradient
t
p
Incr
Mean
Mean
Mean
Change Items
4.11
4.22
.05
.53 .600
2.41
Relational Items
5.22
5.42
.08
.84 .402
3.70
a
Likelihood of Hiring
38.42
37.85
-.24
-.09 .926
59.36

Far
Entity Gradient
Mean
3.31
.38
4.57
.37
37.41
-9.35

t

p

6.06
4.78
-4.92

< .001
< .001
< .001

t

p

-5.02
-4.12
-.08

<.001
< .001
.934

Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

Table 18
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Time (Near vs. Far) by Incremental (-1 SD) and Entity (+1 SD) Theories
Incremental
Entity
Variable
Near
Far Gradient
t
p
Near
Far Gradient
Mean
Mean
Mean Mean
Change Items
4.11
2.41
-.85 -9.42 <.001
4.22
3.31
-.45
Relational Items
5.22
3.70
-.76 -7.42 < .001
5.42
4.57
-.42
Likelihood of Hiring a
38.42
59.36
10.47
3.99 < .001
37.85 37.41
-.22
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

TIME, IMPLICIT THEORIES, RACE, AND MORAL JUDGMENTS

53

Time and race. When examining the results of the previously-described multiple linear
regression, we found a significant interaction between time condition, primarily in the Near vs.
Far comparison, and race condition. Though this finding was not hypothesized, it predicted many
different dependent variables in a consistent pattern.
When looking at only the 3 or 10 Year conditions, the Time X Race interaction predicted
participant estimations of the likelihood of reoffending, β = -.167, t (162) = 2.46, p = .015.
Simple slopes analysis revealed that this result was driven by higher predictions of reoffending
for the Black offender in the 3 year condition; participants made significantly higher predictions
for the Black offender (a mean guess of a 31.67% chance of reoffending) than the White
offender (M = 21.21) when three years had passed (t (162) = 2.49, p = .014), and higher
predictions for the Black offender after three years (M = 31.67) than after ten years (M = 17.45; t
(162) = -3.17, p = .002); all other slopes were non-significant. This is the only significant
interaction when comparing three and ten years.
When comparing the Near and Far time conditions, however, a more consistent pattern
can be seen, with the Race X Time interaction significantly predicting the change and relational
items, and person judgments (all β’s >.113, all t’s (250) > 2.18, all p’s < .030), and marginally
predicting shame items (β = .114, t (250) = 1.76, p = .079) and the relative importance of
rehabilitation and punishment (β = .100, t (250) = 1.77, p = .077). A simple slopes analysis
revealed that for all dependent variables in the White condition, and for change, relational, and
person judgment items in the Black condition, judgments were significantly more negative when
the act was more recent; shame items and rehabilitation vs. punishment in the Black condition
also shared the same pattern, though these differences were not significant. In all cases, the slope
gradient for each dependent variable was steeper in the White condition than in the Black
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condition, and the mean score in the near condition was higher (indicating more negative
judgment) for White offenders than Black ones, while in the far condition, the mean score was
higher for Black offenders than White ones. These patterns are partially borne out by additional
simple slopes analyses; in the near condition, participants judge the White offender significantly
more harshly than the Black offender on relational items, t (250)= -2.10, p = .037, and
marginally more harshly for shame (t (250) = -1.72, p = .087) and change (t (250) = -1.77, p =
.078) items, while in the far condition, Black offenders are judged more negatively than White
offenders for person judgments (t (250) = 2.39, p = .017) and preference for punishment over
rehabilitation (t (250) = 2.74, p = .007).
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Table 19
Beta Values for Race X Time Interaction
Variable
Time Condition
Likelihood of Repeating
3 vs. 10
Shame Items
Near vs. Far
Change Items
Near vs. Far
Relational Items
Near vs. Far
Person Judgements
Near vs. Far
Rehabilitation vs. Punishment
Near vs. Far

B (unstandardized)
-3.79
.14
.14
.16
.17
.19

β (Standardized)
-.17
.11
.12
.12
.11
.10

t
-2.46
1.76
2.37
2.18
2.28
1.77

p
.015
.079
.019
.030
.023
.077

Table 20
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Race X Time Interaction (3 VS 10 Years)
White
Variable
3 Yrs
10 Yrs
Gradient
t
p
3 Yrs
Mean
Mean
Mean
Likelihood of Repeating
21.21
22.17
.48
.23 .821
31.67
3 Years
Variable
White Black
Gradient
t
p
White
Mean
Mean
Mean
Likelihood of Repeating
21.21
31.67
5.23
2.49 .014
22.17

Black
Gradient

10 Yrs
Mean
17.45
-7.11
10 Years
Black
Gradient
Mean
17.45
-2.36

t
-3.17
t
-1.05

p
.002
p
.297
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Table 21
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Race at Near (2 Months) or Far (3/10 Years) Time Condition
White
Black
Variable
Near
Far
Gradient t
p
Near
Far
Gradient
t
p
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Shame Items
4.19
3.59
-.30
-2.57
.011
3.75
3.69
-.03
-.28
.780
Change Items
4.34
2.76
-.79
-8.83 < .001
3.99
2.98
-.51
-5.66
< .001
Relational Items
5.53
4.04
-.75
-7.46 < .001
5.11
4.25
-.43
-4.32
< .001
Person Judgments
5.85
3.63
-1.11
-10.12 < .001
5.59
4.06
-.77
-7.00
< .001
Rehab vs. Punishment
4.00
2.96
-.52
-3.21
.001
3.93
3.66
-.14
-.92
.360
Table 22
Predicted Values and Simple Slopes for Time at White or Black Race Condition
Near
Variable
White
Black
Gradient
t
p
White
Mean
Mean
Mean
Shame Items
4.19
3.75
-.22 -1.72 .087
3.59
Change Items
4.34
3.99
-.18 -1.77 .078
2.76
Relational Items
5.53
5.11
-.21 -2.10 .037
4.04
Person Judgments
5.85
5.59
-.13 -1.01 .313
3.63
Rehab vs. Punishment
4.00
3.93
-.04
-.20 .845
2.96

Black
Mean
3.69
2.98
4.25
4.06
3.66

Far
Gradient
.05
.11
.10
.21
.35

t

p

.55
1.38
1.04
2.39
2.74

.584
.168
.299
.017
.007
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Race by Modern Racism by Implicit Theories. Again, when examining our results, we
found an interaction that was not hypothesized, but which significantly or marginally predicted
many of our dependent variables. This three-way interaction was found between Race, Modern
Racism, and Time, but only in the 3 vs. 10 year comparison. Because it was not hypothesized,
and because the power of this study is low for examining three-way interactions, we will not
break down these findings in great detail. Briefly, though, a simple slopes analysis did find that
higher modern racism scores predicted negative responses primarily among those participants
who were incremental theorists reading about a Black offender; and that endorsing an entity
theory of change predicted negative responses primarily among participants low in modern
racism who read about a Black offender, and participants high in modern racism who read about
a White offender.
Table 23
Beta Values for Race X Modern Racism X Implicit Theories Interaction (3 VS 10 Years)
Variable
B (unstandardized) β (Standardized)
t
Jail Items
-.23
-.23
-3.13
Change Items
-.10
-.14
-1.91
Relational Items
-.12
-.15
-1.93
Person Judgements
-.14
-.16
-2.12
Alternatives to Prison a
.17
.23
2.80
a
Act vs. Behaviour
.21
.16
2.03
Note: a Higher numbers = more positive overall judgments

p
.002
.058
.055
.036
.006
.044
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Discussion
In the present study, we attempted to replicate our previous findings: that the implicit
theories of participants would predict judgments about past offenders; that participants’ levels of
modern racism would predict judgments when reading about an offender assumed to be Black,
but not White; that the relationship between modern racism (moderated by the assumed race of
the offender) and judgments of offenders would be mediated by the subjective perception of time
passed since the original crime; and that participants who were sufficiently motivated to shift
their implicit theories, in this case participants high in modern racism who read about a Black
offender who had appeared to change over a ten year span (contrary to their potentially
prejudiced views), did so, shifting towards a more entity perspective. In addition, we attempted
to replace our questionable previous method of race manipulation with a more overt method that
would be more resistant to racial misperceptions.
We succeeded on two counts. Our race manipulation did lead the vast majority of
participants to make the intended assumptions about the race of the offender; 93.8% of
participants correctly identified the offender’s race, in contrast to 71.1% in the initial study, and
56.1% in the failed second study. Furthermore, we found that consistent with our previous
findings, implicit theories did significantly predict participant judgments of the offender, the
likelihood of re-offense and employment decisions, and more general legal principles, with entity
theorists again providing more negative responses, and supporting more punitive general
principles, than incremental theorists. This was true both among participants who read only
about the crime occurring three or ten years previously, and participants who read about the
crime having occurred only two months earlier.
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Our other results were not as consistent with our previous findings. Our previous,
interaction between offender race and the modern racism score reported by participants, whereby
those high in modern racism would judge the Black offender (but not the White offender) more
harshly than those low in modern racism, was not replicated; indeed, for two of the only three
dependent variables that were significantly or marginally predicted by the interaction of race and
modern racism, this was driven by White offenders being judged more positively by those low in
modern racism than high scorers, with no significant differences for Black offenders. Despite the
fact that subjective distance was the one dependent variable predicted by this interaction, the
inconsistent nature of the relationship in this study also meant that subjective distance could not
be meaningfully tested as a mediator between modern racism (moderated by race) and the other
dependent variables. We did find that subjective distance was correlated with the same
dependent variables as the previous study, however, which indicates that it does seem to play a
role.
What might account for this difference in results between the two studies? The one
obvious difference is the overtness of the race manipulation. While given the difficulties
previously encountered, there are clear methodological problems with using a race name
manipulation, but it is a subtle way of manipulating race. Though the pictures used in this study
could be part of a news article, they are very overt indications of race, and participants may have
guessed at that point that race perceptions would be part of this study. There is evidence that
overt manipulations of social categories can lead participants to guess the purpose of the
research. According to Fein and Spencer (1997), when a social judgment task included the fact
that the male subject of the judgment was gay, over half of research participants suspected that
the study concerned their beliefs about gay men. When that information was removed, but other
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material consistent with gay stereotypes was included, however, no participants guessed the
study’s purpose. It could be that our picture manipulation also led participants to suspect that the
study concerned their beliefs about different racial groups, and this, alongside the knowledge that
expressing racist attitudes is socially unacceptable, could have led participants to different
answers on the dependent measures, or particularly when responding to the Modern Racism
Scale, which is not the most subtle measure of racism. Those who are low in modern racism in
this study could be a combination of true low scorers, and higher scorers who are high in social
desirability traits.
We did find evidence for our original hypothesis, unsupported by Study 1, that
incremental theorists would be more sensitive to increases in the passage of time than entity
theorists. When comparing reactions to the recent (two months since the original crime) article to
the more distant (three and ten years), we found that a time by implicit theories interaction
significantly predicted three dependent variables, with all three demonstrating the same pattern
of results: in the recent condition, participants were equally negative towards the offender,
independent of their reported implicit theories, but in the distant condition, while all participants
responded more positively towards the offender, participants who endorsed an incremental
perspective became significantly more positive than those who endorsed an entity perspective.
One concern that must be kept in mind when interpreting these results is that, as was
mentioned earlier, the article in the recent condition has several differences from either of the
distant articles, beyond just the differences in time. The most relevant difference, for these
results, is that the man in the three and ten year articles has married, started a family, started a
business, and integrated successfully into his community, all of which can be considered
evidence of change. When only two months has passed since the original crime, some of these
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actions are not possible, and others, like marriage, may be seen as motivated by recklessness or
desperation before heading to prison rather than genuine change; as a result, we chose not to
mention any of these acts in the recent condition, and no evidence of change is presented. It may
be that the differences in responses in the three and ten year conditions are driven by responses
to these events that may indicate change, rather than time passing, whereby they are more
believed by incremental theorists than entity theorists. A follow-up should be conducted to
determine whether it is this, or the passage of time, that is responsible for these differences.
Finally, we discovered two results that were not anticipated. The first, an interaction
between offender race and time condition (predominantly the Near vs. Far comparison), shows a
consistent pattern whereby White offenders are judged more harshly than Black ones in the
recent condition, it is the Black offenders who are seen more negatively in the distant condition.
This pattern, though unexpected, could reflect an interesting tendency for social desirability
norms to be strongest in the most overt and unambiguous condition (recent crime): here people
may take care not to judge the Black offender too harshly (resulting in a reverse tendency to
judge them less harshly). However it is notable that with time and evidence of change, this
lenience toward Black offenders disappears. It may be that evidence of change and rehabilitation
is a form of ambiguous information that is weighed subjectively and counts for more when
judging White than Black offenders once time has passed.
The second unexpected effect was a three-way interaction between offender race, modern
racism scores, and participant implicit theories, is only present when comparing the three- and
ten-year articles. These findings were more complicated, but three patterns of results seemed to
appear more consistently among the six dependent variables: when incremental theorists read
about a Black offender, their judgments were predicted by their modern racism scores, with
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higher scores predicting more negative judgments; and when participants low in modern racism
read about a Black offender, or participants high in modern racism read about a White offender,
their judgments were predicted by their implicit theories of change, with higher endorsement of
entity theory predicting more negative judgments. Because these results are not consistent with
the first study, and because they may be artifacts of potential methodological flaws already
discussed, namely our race manipulation or differences between time conditions, more research
should be performed to establish or disprove these effects.
General Discussion
Through our two successful studies, we have consistently demonstrated one thing:
individuals’ personally held implicit theories of change greatly shape how they judge unaffiliated
others who have transgressed, perhaps especially when those transgressions are set in the distant
past. Previous research has shown that implicit theories influence how people view and judge
transgressions as they occur, or in the immediate past (e.g., Miller, Burgoon & Hall, 2007;
Kammrath & Peetz, 2012; Chiu et al., 1997), but little research up until now has extended those
findings into transgressions set in the distant past; no research, as far as we have determined, has
examined judgments of unaffiliated others who have committed transgressions in the distant
past, or of any others who have committed moral (rather than interpersonal) transgressions.
Furthermore, our research is consistent with the body of evidence (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Miller,
Burgoon & Hall, 2007; Gervey et al., 1999) asserting that entity theorists, rather than incremental
theorists, respond more negatively to moral transgressions and the individuals who commit them,
though future research must be conducted in order to determine why in some studies (Ng &
Tong, 2013; Kammrath & Peetz, 2012), this pattern is reversed.
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Though we did not find other consistencies between our two studies, we did learn a great
deal about different forms of race manipulations, and how participants may think about the
passage of time occurring to another person, which we can apply to future studies in this area of
study.
The problem of race. Throughout three studies, we attempted to manipulate offender
race differently three times, twice with name manipulations and once with photographs. Through
each attempt, we learned something new about how difficult it is to manipulate something
seemingly straightforward.
With our first manipulation attempt, we came to learn that race name manipulations do
not seem to work as reported in past literature (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). While prior
research has stated with confidence that participants can assess the race of individuals given
racially associated first and last names, we found that not only were there large proportions of
our sample who made racial guesses inconsistent with the intended race, but that those
inconsistencies happened at different rates across different race conditions – participants were far
more likely to choose an answer consistent with our intentions when presented with a
stereotypically Black name than one that is stereotypically White. This could be due to the
context of this study – while research by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), from which one of
our name manipulations was drawn directly, presents these names in the context of a person’s
resume, our research has set them in a criminal context, and it could mean that people’s
knowledge of negative stereotypes about Black males and criminality allows them to more
readily accept the criminal offender as Black rather than White. It is also possible that the prior
research is now outdated, and that stereotypical racial names are no longer enough to allow
individuals to draw conclusions about the race of an individual. There may also be some concern
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that participants are purposely reporting their assumptions incorrectly due to social desirability,
or a need to appear politically correct, though this is less concerning given the fact that any
effects found were significant when looking at the race that was assumed by participants, rather
than the randomly assigned race condition. Regardless, it is clear that using racially stereotypical
names as a manipulation paradigm is ineffective for this type of research, whether due to
subtlety, contextual clues, or social desirability.
Aside from our second manipulation attempt confirming that race names are not an
effective manipulation strategy, we also found that giving participants a method of ‘opting out’
of predicting an offender’s race was actually counterproductive. There had been concerns that
some of the guesses inconsistent with the intended condition in the original study had been due
to the lack of options for participants who truly did not know the race of the offender, and we
therefore added an ‘I Don’t Know’ choice to the race options. Though this did decrease the rate
of incorrect guesses from 28.9% to 12.2%, we found that almost a third of participants chose this
option; given that the rates of inconsistent choices between studies decreased by only 16.7%,
those who chose the ‘I Don’t Know’ option almost certainly include a large number of
participants who would have made consistent guesses given the options present in Study 1. We
therefore chose to not include this option in future studies. Though this decision does run the risk
of participants who genuinely cannot guess not being able to select such an option, the cost of
having a third of participants not answer this key question was too great to accept.
Our third study was able to successfully manipulate race through the use of pictures. This
overt manipulation, however, was not without its own consequences. Though participants were
generally accurate when stating the race of the offender, any pattern of results related to race that
were found diverged entirely from our initial results; this is particularly notable when our
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dependent variables are predicted by a Race X Modern Racism interaction, wherein those lowest
in modern racism are, counterintuitively, the most judgmental of the Black offender. A likely
consequence of the overtness of our measure is that some participants may have intuited our
study’s purpose, or at the very least that offender race is one of our variables of interest, and that
this may have in turn influenced their responses to judgment questions or on the modern racism
scale itself. Furthermore, given that this was an American sample population, it could be that the
current political climate in the United States, with protests arising from several recent police
shootings and violent harassment of Black individuals, has made participants even more
sensitive to such an overt manipulation. Regardless, it is clear that though our overt methods did
lead to more accurate assumptions regarding offender race, it was not a more effective
manipulation.
What, then, is the best way to manipulate race in similar future studies? When the
methodology is too subtle, many participants do not report picking up on the manipulation at all.
When it is too overt, though, it seems that participants may become somewhat aware of the
study’s purpose, and adjust their answers accordingly. A middle ground must be found, but
unfortunately, we have not discovered what this middle ground is. One possibility may be to
reinforce a name manipulation by including other Black- or White-stereotypic information into
an article, such as location (a predominantly Black neighbourhood such as Harlem, or a
predominantly White location such as Maine), but taking care to not provide so much
information as to make it obvious. Another would be to use a more overt manipulation, such as
pictures, but embedding it in a much larger study context, where participants cannot be certain
what is being researched. Either way, future research must take care to carefully consider how
race is being manipulated.
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The problem of time. Throughout both studies, it seems clear that participants do not
perceive an event very differently when it is set three or ten years in the past. It is possible that
our findings in regards to subjective time may partially explain these effects: participants may
not think carefully about the passage of three or ten years, but may instead conceive of both as
‘distant’, without any finer distinction. Perhaps having participants reflect upon their own lives at
that time period would help put the passage of time in more concrete terms. Furthermore,
presenting participants with evidence of change may have erased differences that may exist
normally given the passage of time - without any evidence of change, people may naturally
assume that more change occurs in a longer period of time, but by outright stating what changes
have occurred, both time periods may have been placed in the ‘distant’ category. Removing
change information may be necessary to prevent this. It is also possible that the passage of
calendar time is not as meaningful as people’s subjective conception of time, and that it is this
subjective sense of time that should be examined more carefully. Subjective time can be
manipulated, and by framing a similar news article in one of two ways – “quite some time ago,
this crime was committed” versus “not so long ago, this crime was committed” – we could more
clearly detangle the competing roles of objective, calendar time, and subjective perceptions of
time.
Significant differences were found between both ‘distant’ conditions and our more
‘recent’, two months ago condition, however we cannot confidently state that this was due to
differences in time. Because we had hoped to replicate our distant condition as closely as
possible, but with a much stricter timeframe, a great deal of information about the offender could
not be included in the recent condition, and this absence of information, or the presence of
information in the distant conditions, may have instead driven any significant time effects.
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Future research would need to assess this question using far more directly comparable articles;
the distant article could be rewritten to be more similar to the recent article, though the
offender’s presence in or absence from prison after a long period of time may also provide
participants with more information than in the strictly recent condition.
Other limitations and future directions. As mentioned previously, this research was
conducted on survey websites, using an exclusively American population, at a time when racial
tensions have garnered political action and media attention. This could partially explain why
participants reacted counterintuitively to our overt race manipulation, and could have attenuated
any race effects; it is also possible, however, that the exposure of these racial issues could have
exaggerated any effects found, due to the extremely sensitive and divisive issues at play. Future
research should be run using another population, and perhaps another marginalized group.
Our only measure of racial prejudice is the Modern Racism Scale. Though it was created
in order to assess racist attitudes in a more subtle fashion, it was designed almost thirty years
ago, and what was once a subtle measure has become more and more overt, while social pressure
to not appear racist has only increased. In future studies, we would prefer to replace this measure
with something that is less obvious, particular an implicit (rather than explicit) measure of
prejudice. In addition, this would solve another potential limitation that was present due to the
use of this scale: in order to disguise our interest in race, this scale was always presented at the
very end of our studies, meaning that responses to this scale may have been coloured by
participants having read about the crime scenario, and having answered numerous judgment
questions. By using a more subtle, or implicit, measure of racial prejudice, we could assess all of
our measured independent variables at the beginning of our studies.
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This line of research was started, in part, to assess differences between incremental and
entity theorists when making moral judgments. It is worth noting, however, that in both of our
distant conditions, the article provided some information that would seem to support an
incremental perspective: the offender had not committed another crime, and had made positive
efforts both in his personal life and in his community. It is possible that participant judgments
were partially due to having just received information that (dis)confirmed their lay theories of
change. Future research should assess whether the same pattern of results is found when there is
no evidence for either change or stability, or when there is evidence against change.
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Appendix A: Premeasure of Implicit Theories
Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the
following statements, as they apply to yourself, by selecting the number that corresponds to your
opinion in the space underneath each statement.
1: Strongly Disagree 2: Disagree
4: Somewhat Agree 5: Agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Strongly Agree

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability.
In making decisions, I compare various viewpoints of others to construct my own view.
At times, I think I am no good at all.
People’s moral character is something basic about them and they can’t change it much.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
There is not much that can be done to change people’s moral traits (e.g., uprightness
and honesty).
10. To make a commitment, I need to contrast two or more possible options.
11. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
12. The kind of person someone is, is something very basic about them and it can’t be
changed very much.
13. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people.
14. I certainly feel useless at times.
15. Considering opposite viewpoints assists me in understanding myself.
16. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who people are can’t really
be changed.
17. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.
18. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
19. To show that you are paying attention to these questions, please choose 'strongly agree' for
this question.
20. I often weigh both the good and the bad aspects of any situation or experience.
21. Whether someone is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their
personality. It cannot be changed very much.
22. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they
conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
23. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
24. Comparing the implications of conforming versus rebelling helps me make a moral choice.
25. Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really
change that.
26. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
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27. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck happenings.
28. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
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Appendix B: News Article, Three or Ten Years (All Studies)
Below you will find a news article that describes a current legal issue in the United States.
Please read it carefully, as we will be asking you for your thoughts about this article. We will
also ask you to remember some details about the article later in the survey, so please do read
thoroughly and with careful attention.
You are encouraged to spend as much time reading as needed to have a full understanding of
the article. Please note that in order to ensure that the article is read, the button to continue to
the next page will be disabled for 30 seconds.
[Brad/DeShawn] Jones7 lived a normal life for [three/ten] years following
his [2011/2004] conviction for armed robbery because Illinois officials forgot he was out on bail.
He’s now in prison and suing for his freedom, but state officials say he’s not the victim of cruel
and unusual treatment.
Jones had just one arrest for marijuana possession on his record when he and a cousin robbed an
assistant manager at a Burger King restaurant on Jan. 15, [2011/2004]. The men, wearing masks,
showed a gun (it turned out to be a BB gun) and demanded money that was about to be placed in
a deposit box.
The worker gave up the bag of cash, and the masked men drove away. The worker turned in the
car's licence plate number.
Jones, who was 22 at the time, had never been convicted of a serious crime before the robbery.
He was sentenced to [three/ten] years in prison for the holdup, then told to wait for orders that
would specify when and where he was to report to prison.
He told the Associated Press last month that he waited, and even asked about going to prison, but
the order never came.
In the years since his conviction, [Brad/DeShawn] Jones started his own construction-related
businesses, married and had a child. He also coached youth football and volunteered at his
church in Woodridge, Illinois.
The Illinois Department of Corrections realized in July 2014 that Jones never served a three-year
sentence for the robbery due to an apparent clerical error. He was arrested and forced to begin
the stretch.
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan said Tuesday in a court filing that Jones's8 belated time
behind bars is not cruel and unusual, as Jones argues in a lawsuit.
“The state has to do what the state has to do, and toe the party line, so to speak – and the party
line is that the guilty must be punished, and that’s it and that’s all,” she says.
7

Study 1: Brad Jones (White) or DeShawn Jones (Black)
Study 2: Brett McCarthy (White) or Jamal Washington (Black)
Study 3: Steve Williams (both race conditions)
8
Study 2 and 3: Full name (Brett McCarthy or Jamal Washington; Steve Williams) is used instead of only last name
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Appendix C: News Article, Recent Past Condition (Study 2 and 3 Only)
Below you will find a news article that describes a current legal issue in the United States.
Please read it carefully, as we will be asking you for your thoughts about this article. We will
also ask you to remember some details about the article later in the survey, so please do read
thoroughly and with careful attention.
You are encouraged to spend as much time reading as needed to have a full understanding of the
article. Please note that in order to ensure that the article is read, the button to continue to the
next page will be disabled for 15 seconds.
[Brett McCarthy/Jamal Washington/Steve Williams] was recently convicted of armed
robbery and is now in prison.
[McCarthy/Washington/Williams] had just one arrest for marijuana possession on his record
when he and a cousin robbed an assistant manager at a Burger King restaurant on January 15,
2015, according to police. The men, wearing masks, showed a gun (it turned out to be a BB gun)
and demanded money that was about to be placed in a deposit box. The worker gave up the bag
of cash, and the masked men drove away. The worker turned in the car's licence plate number.
[Brett McCarthy/Jamal Washington/Steve Williams], 22, from Woodbridge, Illinois, had
never been convicted of a serious crime before the robbery. He was sentenced Friday to three
years in prison for the holdup.
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Appendix E: Dependent Measures – Page 1
Please think about this person and give your judgments of that person in the present on the
following dimensions. To what degree is this specific person:
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

Trustworthy 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Untrustworthy

Likeable

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unlikeable

1

For the following questions, imagine that you become acquainted with the person in the article.
How likely would you be to judge this person based on their act?
How likely would you be to forgive this person for their act?
How likely would you be to trust this person?
How likely would you be to become friends with this person?
How likely would you be to purposely avoid this person?
How likely would you be to spend time with this person?
1: Very Unlikely
4: Neither Likely Nor Unlikely

2: Unlikely
5:Somewhat Likely

3: Somewhat Unlikely
6: Likely
7: Very Likely

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:
This person is unforgivable.
This person is a different person now than when they committed the act.
My judgment of this person is in no way affected by this act.
This person is completely trustworthy.
1: Strongly Disagree
4: Neither Agree Nor Disagree
7: Strongly Agree

2: Disagree
5: Somewhat Agree

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Agree
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Appendix E: Dependent Measures – Page 2
This person has been completely rehabilitated.
This person still needs to be punished for their crime.
Since the crime, this person has become a model citizen.
This person feels guilty about their crime.
This person feels ashamed of their crime.
It would be cruel to jail this person at this point in time.
It is unjust to society to allow this person to go unpunished.
This person's actions since their crime have been commendable.
1: Strongly Disagree
4: Neither Agree Nor Disagree

2: Disagree
5: Somewhat Agree

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Agree
7: Strongly Agree

Think about the crime this person committed. What do you think is the percent likelihood that
this person would repeat their earlier behavior (i.e., commit another crime) in the future?
0 – 100 Percent chance of reoffending [on slider scale]
Pretend that you are a hiring manager for a company, and that this person applies for an open
job position. They have the necessary qualifications, and are honest about their criminal history.
What is the percent likelihood that you would hire this person for a job?
0 – 100 Percent chance of hiring [on slider scale]
Think back to the news article. Please think about the act committed itself, rather than the
person who committed the act, and give your judgments of the act on the following dimensions.
To what degree is this specific act:
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Good

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Bad

TIME, IMPLICIT THEORIES, RACE, AND MORAL JUDGMENTS

83

Appendix E: Dependent Measures – Page 3
Sometimes events tend to feel closer or further away, regardless of how long ago it actually
occurred. Think about the original crime described in the article. Place the slider at the point
that best indicates how long ago that act feels to you.
Feels very recent – Feels very long ago [on slider scale]
Think about the article you read. How likely do you think it is that this person could change?
1: Very Unlikely
4: Neither Likely Nor Unlikely

2: Unlikely
3: Somewhat Unlikely
5: Somewhat Likely 6: Likely
7: Very Likely

Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: This person is incapable
of change.
1: Strongly Disagree
4: Neither Agree Nor Disagree

2: Disagree
5: Somewhat Agree

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Agree
7: Strongly Agree
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Appendix E: Dependent Measures – Page 4
Now we are going to ask you several questions about sentencing in this particular case, given
the circumstances that occurred. The following questions ask about what you think would be a
fair sentence for this person, right now; that is, any criminal sentence that should be served now
that the Department of Corrections discovered their error.
How long do you think an appropriate prison sentence for this crime should be now? This
number can be higher or lower than the original sentence of three years. (If you do not think that
person should serve a prison sentence now, please write 0 in both boxes.)
Years:
Months:
How long is the minimum acceptable prison sentence for this crime now, in your opinion? This
number can be higher or lower than the original sentence of three years. (If you do not think that
person should serve a prison sentence now, please write 0 in both boxes.)
Years:
Months:
How long is the maximum acceptable prison sentence for this crime now, in your opinion? This
number can be higher or lower than the original sentence of three years. (If you do not think that
person should serve a prison sentence now, please write 0 in both boxes.)
Years:
Months:
How appropriate do you think the following consequences are, as an alternative to a prison
sentence?
No punishment;
Fine; Probation;
Community service; Time served; House arrest;
Other (please specify)
1 - Not At All
2
3
4
5
6
7 - Very
Which factor is more important to you when making a judgment about a person who committed
a crime?
The act that
was committed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Their behaviour
since the act

Which factor is more important to you when making a judgment about consequences for
crimes?
That criminals
are rehabilitated

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

That criminals
are punished

We are interested in what went through your mind when thinking about this person's case. Please
explain any thoughts or important considerations that you took into account when reading the
news article and answering all of the questions about the article.
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Appendix F: Manipulation Checks, Study 1
Now we are going to ask you some questions that gauge your memory of the news article.
Please answer these questions to the best of your ability, and if you do not remember the
specific information, please give your best guess.
In what year was the original crime committed?
[dropdown menu, choices include every year between 1995 and 2014]
How many years ago was the original crime committed?
[dropdown menu, choices include every number between 1 and 20]
What do you think was the ethnicity/race of the man described in the article?
Caucasian (White); African American (Black); South Asian; Arab; Chinese; West Indian;
Filipino;
South East Asian; Hispanic; Japanese; Korean; Other
What was the name of the man described in the article? If you do not remember, please include
your best guess.
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Appendix G: Post-Manipulation Check Measures (Study 1)
Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements, as they apply to yourself, by selecting the number that corresponds to
your opinion in the space underneath each statement.
1. People’s moral character is something basic about them and they can’t change it much.
2. There is not much that can be done to change people’s moral traits (e.g., uprightness and
honesty).
3. Whether someone is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their
personality. It cannot be changed very much.
4. The kind of person someone is, is something very basic about them and it can’t be
changed very much.
5. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who people are can’t really
be changed.
6. Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really
change that.
1: Strongly Disagree 2: Disagree
4: Somewhat Agree 5: Agree

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Strongly Agree

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the
following statements, as they apply to yourself, by selecting the number that corresponds to your
opinion in the space underneath each statement.
1. Over the past few years, government and media have shown more consideration for racial
and ethnic minorities than is warranted.
2. Racial and ethnic minorities have gotten more than they deserve over the past few years
3. It is easy to understand the anger of racial and ethnic minorities.
4. Discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities is no longer a problem.
5. Racial and ethnic minorities are getting too demanding pushing for equal rights they
already have
6. Racial and ethnic minorities should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
1: Strongly Disagree 2: Disagree
4: Somewhat Agree 5: Agree

3: Somewhat Disagree
6: Strongly Agree
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Appendix H: Demographics
Please complete the following questions:
Age:
Gender: Male; Female; Other (please specify)
Ethnicity you identify with the most: Chinese; South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi,
Sri Lankan); Black (e.g., African-American, African, Haitian, Jamaican, Somali); Arab; West
Indian (e.g., Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan); Filipino; South East Asian
(e.g., Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian); Hispanic; Japanese; Korean; Caucasian (White); Other
(please specify)
First language:
Political leaning: Very liberal; Somewhat liberal; Moderate; Somewhat conservative; Very
conservative; Libertarian; None/uninterested; Other (please specify)
Religious affiliation or belief system: No religious affiliation; Christian (e.g. Catholic, Protestant,
Lutheran); Muslim (e.g. Shia, Sunni); Jewish (e.g. Orthodox, Reform); Hindu; Sikh; Atheist;
Agnostic; Buddhist; Spiritual but not religious; Other (please specify)
How important is your religious affiliation or belief system to you?
1: Not at all Important
2: Very Unimportant
3: Somewhat Unimportant
4: Neither Important nor Unimportant
5: Somewhat Important
6: Very
Important
7: Extremely Important
When conducting research, we rely on participants' responses being honest and accurate in order
for us to draw valid conclusions from the data. However, we recognize that there are many
reasons participants might be unable or unwilling to provide fully honest and accurate responses.
In these cases it is truly helpful for us to be able to identify responses that may not be valid so we
can take this into account.
In your honest opinion, should we use your data from this survey?
Please note: your answer is confidential, and you will be compensated whichever answer you
choose.
Yes/No
Why do you think we should NOT use your data? [if previous answer is Yes]

